18 



In June 1941, the NDRC was expanded to become the OSRD, 6 

 largely because of the limitations Bush saw in the NDRC. NDRC's 

 authority was to conduct research on new military devices. Howev- 

 er, it could not proceed with development, even on the scale of pro- 

 totypes. Moreover, it was not fully integrated into the overall 

 weapons research planning conducted within the armed services. 

 Bush favored the establishment of a separate, independent Federal 

 organization that could obtain independent funding through Con- 

 gressional appropriations, rather than be limited to Presidential 

 emergency funds. In addition, Bush believed the head of such an 

 organization should have direct access to the President. He also 

 thought the agency should include military medical research, some- 

 thing that the NDRC lacked. 7 



The OSRD was placed within the Office of Emergency Manage- 

 ment, under the protection of the White House. It was given its 

 own budget, and, as chairman, Bush was given direct access to the 

 President, making him in effect Roosevelt's personal science advi- 

 sor. The OSRD's purpose was to provide adequate scientific re- 

 search for purposes of national defense, including medical prob- 

 lems, which were handled through OSRD's Committee on Medical 

 Research. The NDRC was made a committee of the new OSRD, and 

 James B. Conant succeeded Bush as its chair. The OSRD was in- 

 tended to last only for the duration of the war — a point that Bush 

 frequently made. And its efforts were to be practical — to provide 

 new weapons for this war, not the next. The scientists organized 

 under Bush were conducting directed, not basic research. 



Bush and the members of the OSRD attempted to avoid disrupt- 

 ing the existing scientific structure. Reliance was placed on man- 

 agement and coordination, and research projects already undertak- 

 en by the Army and Navy were left in place. Supporting and ex- 

 panding the existing system was seen as the quickest and most 

 fruitful approach to mobilizing science and engineering for the war 

 effort. Civilian scientists and engineers did not, therefore, don mili- 

 tary uniforms as they had done during World War I. There was 

 less emphasis placed on establishing new Government laboratories 

 than there was during World War I, although some were created 

 for the top-secret Manhattan Project. These laboratories were not 

 operated by the OSRD, however. The emphasis was on utilizing the 

 existing research teams and facilities located in the nation's uni- 

 versities and business laboratories, largely through the use of con- 

 tracts. One example of such a laboratory, and perhaps the most 

 well-known, was the Radiation Laboratory at M.I.T. where much of 

 the work on the development of radar was centered. 8 Like many of 

 these research establishments and the OSRD itself, the MIT Radi- 

 ation Laboratory was to produce a number of prominent leaders in 

 American science policy during the post-war era. 



The OSRD was tremendously successful in applying science, engi- 

 neering, and medicine to the conduct of the war. Moreover, while it 

 attempted not to disrupt the existing arrangements for research, 



6 Executive Order No. 8807, 28 June 1941. 



7 See Kevles, The Physicists, p. 299. 



8 Ernest C. Pollard, Radiation: One Study of the MIT Radiation Laboratory (Durham, N.C.: 

 Woodburn, 1982). 



