60 



These events were classified as being either technological or scien- 

 tific — the latter category being further classified as either mission- 

 oriented or non-mission-oriented science, that is, basic research. 

 Only nine percent of the events were classified as scientific, with 

 only 0.3 percent (or two events) representing basic research. 10 



Hindsight's conclusion that technological achievements stemmed 

 primarily from mission-oriented engineering research and develop- 

 ment provoked immediate and angry reactions. The study was at- 

 tacked from several angles. It was methodologically flawed, the 

 critics argued, for only tracing the scientific inputs back twenty 

 years. A longer time period would more accurately assess the con- 

 tributions of basic research, for often practical results come long 

 after initial discoveries. In addition, some critics claimed that the 

 weapons systems chosen by the Hindsight researchers were not 

 necessarily representative of types of payoffs most usually associat- 

 ed with basic research. Finally, they maintained that incremental 

 technological changes were studied while major breakthroughs 

 were ignored. 



The reasons behind such criticisms extended beyond methodo- 

 logical concerns, however. Project Hindsight was also perceived as 

 a considerable threat to the science policy establishment. For, one 

 of the basic tenets of government support of scientific research — as 

 argued forcefully by Vannevar Bush — was that basic research was 

 the fountain from which technological progress flowed, and there- 

 fore the source of material advancement. Such arguments justified 

 generous public support of basic research. Hindsight, however, 

 challenged directly the notion that technological innovation is 

 based on advances in science. 



The most elaborate response to Hindsight was the sponsorship of 

 an alternative study— Project TRACES 1X — by the National Science 

 Foundation, an agency whose rationale was questioned by the find- 

 ings of Hindsight. To correct the flaws attributed to the Depart- 

 ment of Defense study, TRACES extended its historical analysis 

 back fifty years and examined what the project directors consid- 

 ered major innovations. 12 Not surprisingly, TRACES reached the 

 opposite conclusion from that of Hindsight: that basic research con- 

 ducted at the nation's universities was the principal factor in the 

 development of important technologies. It followed, therefore, that 

 the Federal Government should continue its support of undirected 

 research. 



The debate over the economic and technological utility of basic 

 research investments engendered by the Hindsight and TRACES 

 studies was never fully resolved. Nevertheless, they did signal a 



10 See Chalmers W. Sherwin and Raymond S. Isenson, First Interim Report on Project Hind- 

 sight (Washington: Office of the Director of Defense Research and Engineering, 1966); Chalmers 

 W. Sherwin and Raymond S. Isenson, "Project Hindsight: A Defense Department Study of the 

 Utility of Research, ' Science, 156 (June 23, 1967), 1571-1577; and Raymond S. Isenson, Project 

 Hindsight Final Report (Washington: Office of the Director of Defense Research and Engineer- 

 ing, 1969). 



1 ' Illinois Institute of Technology Research Institute, Technology in Retrospect and Critical 

 Events in Science (TRACES), 2 volumes (Washington: National Science Foundation, 1968). The 

 NSF subsequently supported a follow-up study: Columbus Laboratories, Interactions of Science 

 and Technology in the Innovative Process: Some Case Studies (Columbus, Ohio: Battelle Memori- 

 al Institute, 1973). 



12 These included magnetic ferrites, birth control pills, video recorders, electron microscopes, 

 and matrix isolation. 



