RACING FOR THE MOON 



77 



downtown who respect the separation of powers. In addition, Brooks 

 was exerting leadership to fashion the committee into an independent 

 force, rather than an appendage of the agencies over which it was 

 exercising oversight. Nevertheless, the committee continued to press 

 for an early decision to commit the Nation to a manned series of flights 

 to the Moon. In the early months of the Kennedy administration, the 

 committee demonstrated that it was far more hawkish on manned 

 space flight than even Mr. Webb would publicly admit at that time. 



THE ATR FORCE CHALLENGE TO N \v\ 



The Committee on Science and Astronautics and its predecessor, 

 the select committee, had entrenched NASA as the custodian of the 

 Nation's space program and endowed it with a distinctly civilian 

 flavor. The Army, Navy and Air Force, each of which had a clear 

 military interest in the development of space weaponry, struggled 

 insistently to wrest more of the space budget away from NASA. The 

 Science Committee listened intently to a parade of military witnesses 

 advocating more power for the military in space in order to protect 

 America's national security. With the exception of a minority of the 

 committee on both sides of the political aisle, generally the com- 

 mittee wound up on the side of NASA and the peaceful uses of space. 



The Air Force launched the most vigorous campaign to support 

 its own role in space, and for several reasons that campaign reached a 

 fever pitch late in I960 and in the early months of 1961. The 1960 

 Presidential campaign had debated the so-called "missile gap," 

 and many of John F. Kennedy's statements stressed the national 

 security aspects of space. When President Kennedy first assumed office 

 and before NASA Administrator Webb began to assert himself, there 

 was a vacuum in leadership on space matters which was not filled 

 until some clear budgetary decisions were made later in the spring of 

 1961. Finally, the Wiesner report contained some criticisms of NASA 

 which the Air Force picked up to strengthen its case. The House 

 Committee on Science and Astronautics printed a very revealing 

 December 1, I960, memorandum from the Office of the Secretary of 

 the Air Force to all Air Force commanders and contractors urging a 

 larger role in space for the Air Force and its contractors. 



When the Wiesner report was unveiled in Chairman Brooks' 

 presence on January 10, 1961, he became disturbed by some of its 

 implications in threatening the role of NASA in space. In February, 

 the Science Committee held its annual round of hearings on defense- 

 interests in space, and heard from the Department of Defense as well 

 as the Army, Navy and Air Force. Following these hearings, Chairman 

 Brooks was impelled to write to President Kennedy on March 9, 1961: 



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