SCI! \c I IN Till Will II H0US1 623 



lorn in out country wc cithci pass .1 bill or appropriate some money and then think 

 the problem will go away, but I would hope we could go very carefully and very 

 slowly. I think .ill the testimony has indicated th.it you people, who should know, 

 think our country .is .1 whole, our legislative and executive branches, are not doing 

 what we should in the scientific and technology held. * * * You can take the old 

 horse to water but you can't make him drink. Just to pa..s a bill, I don't think is 

 the right approat h. I think wc need to pass something that the President will accepi 

 and will use. 



Mosher pushed harder. He responded: 



I think that our initiative in preparing such legislation, together with the 

 Senate, will give the White House, the new White House maybe, an opportunity to 

 react, and that they might welcome. In other words, we can be a catalytic influence 

 if nothing else. 



From that point on, the discussion really took a more positive turn. 

 Martin and Cronin enthusiastically endorsed the idea of pushing 

 forward with legislation, with Cronin suggesting that Congress 

 should provide a magnet, as well as a lightning rod, to pull in support. 

 And as Teague arose to leave because he had to handle a bill on the 

 House floor at noon, he let the cat completely out of the bag. Turning 

 to the witnesses, he announced: 



As soon as we have draft legislation, we will be back in touch with you. 



The die had been cast. On the next day, July 11, Teague interrupted 

 the hearings to remark to the committee: 



We will be in the process of drafting a bill. We hope to get back to you with 

 that bill. We expect to be very careful and go very slowly and get as much input as 

 we can. 



THE DELIBERATE STRATEGY 



For the gung-ho activists on the committee, the "go slow" 

 strategy was disturbing. It was all so academic, at a time when action 

 seemed required. Those advocating the calm, cool, and collected 

 approach could point to both political and substantive advantages of 

 their snail's pace, however. In looking back at the 1974 hearings, the 

 staff made this observation: 



It was about at this point in the 1974 hearings — with a nudge from such 

 people as former Presidential advisers Kistiakowsky (President Eisenhower) and 

 Hornig (President Johnson) — that it became clear we were really dealing with 

 several different issues. We were not just dealing with advice, we were also dealing 

 with Research and Development management including the use and handling of 

 Science and Technology information. It further became apparent that while these 

 were part of the same picture they probably warranted separate consideration and 

 treatment. 



After the July 1974 hearings had adjourned, events moved 

 swiftly. Mosher got in touch with Vice President Ford, a warm 

 friend from the many years they served together in the House. Mosher 



