g4 HISTORY Ol nil < i iMMITTl! ,o.\ SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY 



and have asked the question as to why it was denied * * *. I based my position on 

 the tact that the U.S. effori was "a solidly based, step-by-step program, based on a 

 long period ol effort * * *." 



One after another, members of the committee communicated their 

 intense, sometimes emotional, concern over whether \ \> \ was mov- 

 ing fast enough. Representative Joseph E. Karth (Democrat of Minne- 

 sota) stressed the need to forget the 40-hour week, and pay overtime 

 where the critical bottlenecks were occurring. Representative Jessica 

 McC. Weis (Republican of New York) remarked to Mr. Webb: "It 

 must be very refreshing to be before a committee that is anxious to 

 give you more money than you seem to want." to which Mr. Webb 

 quite diplomatically responded: We "certainly appreciate this com- 

 mittee." The exchanges were tense, the atmosphere highly charged, 

 and once again the committee successfully transmitted the over- 

 powering sentiment of the people that they wished President Kennedy 

 would fulfill his campaign promise in space to "get the country 

 moving again." 



In the small, cramped room 214-B of the Longworth Building, 

 Dr. Seamans and George Low returned to testify on April 14. Low 

 had planned to show the him of the flight of the chimpanzee Ham, 

 originally scheduled for his presentation on April 11. He later confessed: 



We thought it would not be in our best interest to show how we had flown a 

 monkey on a suborbital flight when the Soviets had orbited Gagarin. The chairman 

 did say, "Well, we thought we were going to start with the movie." We looked 

 around and the projectionist wasn't there, and we fumbled and said, "We don't 

 have it with us toda) 



Dr. Seamans' testimony demonstrates how a congressional com- 

 mittee can frequently affect both the timing and substance of a Presi- 

 dential decision, even though the decision itself is made in the White 

 House and is exclusively a Presidential responsibility. 



Under questioning by Karth, Dr. Seamans indicated that additional 

 funds for Saturn enabled NASA to step up the schedule for a manned 

 landing on the Moon. He stated that as a result of the NASA review of 

 the Eisenhower budget, $308 million had been requested above that 

 budget, and the President had approved an increase of $125.6 million 

 of that amount. Asked for his personal opinion as to what NASA could 

 do with additional money for the Apollo program, Seamans responded : 

 "My own opinion is that the country is capable of more effort in this 

 area than it is now expending." 



SPEEDING UP THE LUNAR LANDING TIMETABLE 



Among the welter of questions which bombarded Dr. Seamans on 

 April 14, the one most vividly etched in his memory was posed by 



