SCIENCE IN Till WHITE HOI SI 619 



Senator Kennedy was negative, answering: 



I think, Congressman Hcchlcr, it's probably extremely difficult if the President 



is not willing to support such .1 reorganization. * * * I think the kind of detailed 

 examination that this committee is performing can probably give us the detailed 

 response in answer to that question. 



Senator Kennedy was echoing the thought advanced in the 1973 



hearings by William D. Carey: 



From my experience in doing staff work for live Presidents, 1 know there is 

 nothing to be gained by forcing advisory arrangements on a White House that doesn't 

 want them pretty badly. The advice has nowhere to go, and the adviser is frozen out. 

 There is a futility in keeping candles lighted in an empty church. 



CAREFUL COOPERATION WITH THE WHITE HOUSE 



This concept was central to the committee thinking: any plan 

 developed must be fully acceptable to the White House, and if at 

 all possible worked out in concert with the White House. This is 

 another reason why the impatience of those who saw easy solutions 

 was brushed aside in favor of the careful cooperation patiently con- 

 structed between the two ends of Pennsylvania Avenue. 



"What is clearly needed is an alternative to crisis-based reactive 

 decisionmaking," Dr. Robert C. Seamans, Jr., advised the committee 

 in his capacity as president of the National Academy of Engineering. 

 Dr. Seamans recommended a Council on Science and Technology re- 

 sponsible to the President. When Fuqua expressed the thought that 

 the NSF Director was in a difficult and conflicting situation, as an 

 agency head "recommending science policy to the President, and may- 

 be stepping on the toes of some of his fellow agency administrators," 

 Dr. Seamans responded: "I definitely see a conflict." Fuqua added that 

 scientific advice to the military was an important feature in bringing 

 coordination and balance into national policy. 



Goldwater supported the recommendation of a Council with the 

 observation: 



My personal belief is that we need to elevate this whole subject up to the highest 

 level of priority. 



On the other hand, Symington, while intrigued with the basic idea, 

 saw red when Dr. Seamans suggested that the Director of OMB might 

 be a good person to head the Council: 



I think, from our point of view, it's like giving the cabbages to the goats to 

 care for. It's just that OMB has so many other things to say "No" to, there's no 

 point in adding one more. 



During his testimony, Dr. Seamans made this point about the 

 committee and its work: 



The hearings, independent studies, documents and Interim Staff Report, which 

 you have commissioned and prepared for Phase I are, I believe, fully indicative nor 



