gg HISTORY OF THE COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY 



I don't know that it is. I doubt it. But some feel that way. I think it is a high 

 policy decision to be made and to be made shortly. I think it is important you word 

 your answers carefully here, because the wrong interpretations may be placed upon 

 them not only by this committee but by those who will read the news stories that 

 will go out. 



Dr. Seamans continuing]. I feel this committee is a most important forum for 

 discussion of this issue. I believe there are other important forums. I agree this is a 

 most important national issue. 



Mr. Cm now i i h. The question is whether it is of such great importance that 

 we can afford to neglect other programs that perhaps may involve a change of our 

 whole fiscal program in order to accomplish this one objective. Is it that important, 

 in your opinion? 



Dr. Seamans. Obviously I cannot answer that question. 



Mr. Chenoweth. It is a decision to be made at a higher level. 



Dr. Seamans. I think it is a decision to be made by the people of the United 

 States. 



Mr. Chenoweth. How will they make it? 



Dr. Seamans. Through the Congress and through the President. It is a matter 

 of national importance to have specific objectives for our space effort. 



Mr. Cm nowi in 1 disagree. The people of this country do not have the technical 

 knowledge on this subject that you have. When you talk about placing a man on the 

 Moon, they don't know what you are talking about. They don't know what expendi- 

 ture is involved, nor the scientific and research work that has to be done. We can't 

 expect them to make that decision. 



Mr. Miller. Is this not our responsibility as the representatives of the people? 



Mr. Chenowi ni. We can make the decision. But I think when it comes to affect- 

 ing the economy and the fiscal policies of this country and the tremendous amounts of 

 money that are involved, I think perhaps this will have to be made at a higher level 

 of the administration. 



A battery of television cameras, tape recorders, microphones, and 

 pushing reporters with notebooks greeted Dr. Seamans when he 

 emerged from the hearing room shortly before noon. As the committee 

 remained behind for an hour-long executive session, beads of sweat 

 slowly gathered on Seamans' forehead from the hot glare of the lights 

 in the narrow corridor of the Longworth Building. There was cold 

 sweat when he picked up The New York Times and the Washington 

 Post the following morning. And in the Oval Office at the other end 

 of Pennsylvania Avenue, there was an explosive reaction from Presi- 

 dent Kennedy. 



The Washington Post headlined the testimony: "Reaching Moon 

 First Would Cost Billions, Expert Tells House Unit." The lead began: 

 "A multibillion-dollar crash space program might put an American on 

 the Moon by 1967 — perhaps ahead of the Russians — a top Government 

 official said yesterday." The New York Times correctly interpreted 

 Seamans' testimony in the following terms: "Pointing to the large 

 expense involved in a 'crash' effort to land a man on the Moon, Mr. 

 Seamans repeatedly emphasized that such a venture presented 'a most 



