170 HISTORY OF THE COMMITTEE ON S< II \< I AND TECHNOLOGY 



excessive cost overruns, or public washing of any dirtv linen, congres- 

 sional investigations were warranted. 



Almost all observers and critics of the committee's work, includ- 

 ing most of the personnel in NASA itself, failed to recognize one of 

 the most important roles of the Science Committee which Teague 

 always stressed: the education of Congress and the counrrv on the 

 value of the space program. This in particular meant the persuasion 

 of a majority in the House of Representatives that the program merited 

 continued support. For several reasons, the role of the Manned Space 

 Flight Subcommittee was crucial. In the first place, every Congress- 

 man understood that the objective of a manned lunar landing by the 

 end of the decade, first enunciated by President Kennedy on May 25, 

 1961, was the top priority of the space program. Second, the Manned 

 Space Flight Subcommittee was assigned the major hunk of the NASA 

 budget about $3 billion, or more than half of the entire NASA 

 expenditures. Third, unmanned space science and advanced research, 

 while not directly related to the manned lunar landing, were certainly 

 assisted and spurred along by whatever popular support could be 

 generated by the lunar program. 



Aside from the launching visits and direct contacts with the 

 astronauts, which he constantly encouraged for all Congressmen, 

 Tcague also began on an informal basis to talk with as many noncom- 

 mittee members as possible to help forge the majority necessary to win 

 the authorization and appropriations battles. He also deputized his 

 subcommittee members, and other members of the full committee, to 

 undertake as much missionary work as they had time to do. 



Selling the space program to Congress was no easy task, and 

 Teague and his subcommittee shouldered the heaviest share of the 

 burden. Up to 1962, this was comparatively easy; the shock of Sputnik 

 and Gagarin's flight had not yet worn off, and John Glenn and the 

 other Mercury astronauts had made the program easy to sell. But in 

 1963, the first real opposition surfaced in Congress. 



Congress in 1963 was reflecting incipient dissent from many groups 

 and areas throughout the country, and this dissent expressed itself in 

 several different ways. A large group of scientists began vocal criti- 

 cism of the Moon program, advocating reallocation of NASA's re- 

 sources to the unmanned aspects of space, including more emphasis on 

 instrumented landings on the Moon. Writing in Science magazine on 

 April 19, 1963, Philip H. Abelson editorialized: 



It a scientist is not .unong the crewmen, the alternative of exploration by elec- 

 tronic gear becomes exceedingly attractive. The cost of unmanned lunar vehicles is 

 on the order of 1 percent of the cost of the manned variety; unmanned vehicles van 

 he smaller and need not be returned 



