66 HISTORY OI : THE COMMITTEE OX SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY 



that the committee was getting its point across. Glennan was waiting 

 to testify one morning, following an official committee photograph 

 which had been arranged. 



"We want the Doctor up here too. C'mon up and get a picture with 

 the committee," suggested one of the members. 



Glennan quipped: "Do you want me up there in my usual position, 

 on my knees?" 



The committee persisted in its efforts to get NASA and the admin- 

 istration to raise their sights, and the net effect was to stimulate 

 greater support both in Congress and in the Nation. When some Con- 

 gressmen felt inclined to cut funds from the program, it was easy to 

 produce a huge majority in favor of the proposition that "rather 

 than being cut, the program should be increased." 



EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE 



Early in I960, the committee had a bruising battle with Glennan 

 over documents needed by the committee to review contract awards 

 to the Rocketdyne Division of North American Aviation, Inc., for 

 development of the 1 ! , million-pound-thrust engine, and with McDon- 

 nell Aircraft Corp. for the development and manufacture of Mercury 

 capsules. In examining NASA's contracting procedures for the $102 

 million Rocketdyne contract and the $28 million McDonnell contract, 

 the committee asked for certain documents and NASA refused to fur- 

 nish the committee with reports of its Source Selection Board. Prodded 

 by subcommittee Chairman B. F. Sisk (Democrat of California) and 

 Chairman Brooks, NASA repeatedly refused on grounds of "executive 

 privilege." Glennan's position was expressed in this way: 



This document contains the personal evaluations and recommendations of certain 

 officials of NASA whom I consulted to aid me in reaching my decision on the selection 

 of a prospective contractor. Since this document discloses the personal judgments of 

 subordinates made in the course of preparing recommendations to me, I am sure you 

 will agree with me thai it would not serve the interests of efficient and effective 

 administration of this agency for such a document to be reviewed by anyone outside 

 oi NASA. 



Both contracts were negotiated contracts, and neither of the final 

 awards were given to the lowest bidders. Private meetings with NASA, 

 Chairman Brooks and the staff failed to provide a solution, so Brooks 

 called an executive session for January 12, I960, to obtain the advice of 

 the committee. Teague pointed out: "This is not a matter peculiar to 

 this committee, the policy comes right out of the White House. We are 

 wasting time unless you," turning to Brooks "and the chairman of 

 Foreign Affairs and others get together on the fundamental right of 

 Congress to know." Fulton urged: "Do the dramatic thing. Call him 



