RACING FOR THE MOON 



93 



our position in the world if we seem to think that we can buy our way 

 with money through these programs." But in July, following the 

 address of President Kennedy, Miller supported the committee and the 

 President, and Bass was hard put to round up many allies for his 

 opposition. 



THE COMMITTEE AND THE LUNAR LANDING GOAL 



On a rollcall vote, which can be interpreted as an endorsement of 

 the manned lunar landing goal, the House of Representatives on 

 July 20, 1961, voted 354-59 to authorize $1,784,300,000 for NASA. 



President Kennedy's bold stroke of leadership not only had a 

 profound effect on the Nation, in mobilizing vast scientific, technical, 

 and engineering resources toward the goal of a manned lunar landing; 

 the decision itself immediately impacted on Congress and more specifi- 

 cally the House Committee on Science and Astronautics. The more 

 glamorous aspects of manned space flight, which immediately attracted 

 public attention, vastly expanded the work of the committee. The less 

 publicized aspects of the space program — instrumented planetary 

 probes, basic research, the tracking network, astronomy, and other 

 fields — did not suffer from the light of the Moon, but received greater 

 emphasis because of the increased public and congressional support for 

 NASA. Likewise, the related scientific agencies like the National 

 Science Foundation prospered rather than being squeezed out by the 

 emphasis on Project Apollo. A major scientific revolution, including a 

 surge of interest in education, was sparked by the decision to go to the 

 Moon. 



Once the committee had matured beyond the adolescent thrills of 

 such glorious experiences as meeting astronauts and their families — 

 which never ever ceased to be a thrill — the committee dug in to exercise 

 genuine oversight over the agencies under its jurisdiction. The May 25, 

 1961, decision simply made the job bigger, more important, more 

 exciting and more exacting. The job, to be done right, required travel 

 and firsthand, on-the-spot investigation, a practice encouraged and 

 stimulated by the examples set by successive chairmen — Miller and 

 Teague. 



The man who served the longest as NASA Administrator, James 

 E. Webb, has referred to the 1961 decision as a goal rather than a 

 commitment. Because of the difference in these two terms, the Com- 

 mittee on Science and Astronautics assumed greater importance each 

 year in forging the congressional and public support toward that goal. 

 Each year the battle had to be won over again, while at the same time- 

 carefully maintaining the necessary oversight to insure the maximum 

 efficiency and economy in the program. 



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