HO HISTORY OF THE COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY 



In the decisionmaking process, Teague took his subcommittee to 

 the Cape, to Huntsville, to Houston, to visit with contractors, to talk 

 informally with the astronauts, and to listen, learn, question, argue, 

 and challenge. Something had to give. Meeting in executive session 

 on April 11, 1962, the Teague subcommittee took its first step to kill 

 Nova. The subcommittee voted to cut out of the authorization bill 

 $60,630,000 of construction funds for the gigantic Nova launch com- 

 plex at Cape Canaveral. The subcommittee then slashed $12 million 

 from the Nova test facility in Mississippi. Nova was not terminated, 

 because funds were left in the bill to carry forward the research and 

 development, but the committee sent a clear signal to NASA that 

 Congress wanted a better justification for such a gigantic project with 

 a loosely defined mission. 



NASA responded to the committee prodding. On July 12, 1962, 

 D. Brainerd Holmes, Director of the Office of Manned Space Flight, 

 made a special appearance before the committee to present NASA's 

 clear-cut decision to proceed with the lunar-orbital rendezvous method 

 of landing on the Moon. 



On both sides of the aisle, committee members praised NASA for 

 the manner in which the decision was presented to the committee. 

 Daddario stated: 



I am sure that because of this candid approach that you will get better, and 

 stronger support from the Congress. 



Riehlman added: 



I feel confident that it is this type of presentation that will assure you of closer 

 cooperation with the committee and more favorable consideration in the future. 



Hechler made these remarks to the committee, in commenting on the 

 choice presented: 



I think this will go down as a classic in decisionmaking. History will tell 

 whether it is right. 



Chairman Miller concluded the hearing by noting: 



I think it evidences the good relationship existing between NASA and this 

 committee. 



The decision itself resulted from very thorough studies and 

 excellent arguments by John Houbolt and others of Langley Research 

 Center. It served to sharpen the committee's determination to push 

 NASA on the issue of what was planned for Nova. 



Nova did not die easily. NASA continued to request funds for 

 advanced research on a post-Saturn vehicle. In 1963, von Braun 

 clearly pointed out that Nova was "on the back burner." He did not 

 give up on its future use, but confessed that "when we shall have 

 enough money to go into high gear with Nova we would not want to 

 base it on a concept that we developed in 1962." 



