638 HISTORY OF THI C.OMMITTE1 ONSUIXU WD I I ( H.\( )l.( X ,Y 



administration bill, the July 30 Teague-Mosher bill, the September 16 

 Teague-Mosher compromise, and explanatory notes which furnished 

 the rationale lor the changes. 



MCCORMACK AND BROWN RESERVATIONS 



Two members had serious objections to the September 16 com- 

 promise: Mc( ormack and Brown. They were influential members who 

 could not be ignored. Ranked fourth and fifth in seniority on the 

 Science Subcommittee, and eighth and ninth on the full committee, 

 they also had developed a following and prestige which made their 

 suggestions take on even greater significance. Perhaps a calculated 

 risk had been made in excluding them from the negotiations with the 

 White House, but then it was also a risk to upset the balance of these 

 delicate negotiations by allowing members to ride their particular 

 hobbyhorses. 



Substantively, Brown was very much disturbed that the language 

 on long-range planning of science policy, included in the March ver- 

 sion of the Teague-Mosher bill, had been dropped in the July 30 

 version. While the negotiations were still going on with the White 

 House, Brown wrote Teague a four-page letter on August 29, urging 

 him to reinstate the provisions for long-range, strategic policy plan- 

 ning which had been dropped from title I. Brown argued that codi- 

 fication of planning requirements "would increase the effectiveness 

 of our oversight efforts" and "will provide a framework for our 

 judgment of individual programs." He buttressed his argument with 

 extensive quotations from the National Academy of Sciences and 

 American Association for the Advancement of Science recommenda- 

 tions. The September 16 revision of the bill did not meet Brown's 

 objections, so he wrote again to Teague on September 29, furnishing 

 language of an amendment he said he would offer when the full 

 committee met to mark up the bill. Brown reiterated that a long- 

 range policy planning report would give the committee a yardstick 

 to apply in its oversight and budgetary reviews. The staff immedi- 

 ately went to work in an attempt to draft a compromise amendment 

 which would meet the objections of the administration. The White 

 House would not accept the Brown approach because they felt it 

 w as too burdensome. 



McCormack had a number of discussions with Teague about the 

 bill. He became resigned to the fact that under the circumstances he 

 could not persuade the committee to retain a Cabinet department in 

 the bill. Yet he felt the committee was caving in to the administra- 

 tion too fast in failing to provide for at least a study of a Cabinet 

 department which would furnish an option to the next President. On 



