INTERNATIONA) SCIENTIFN COOPERATION, 1959 419 



ASTRONAUT STAFFORD MODERATES TEAGUES OPPOSITION 



One of the moderating influences on Teague was Air Force astro- 

 naut Thomas P. Stafford, for whom Teague had tremendous respect. 

 Having been designated in January 1973, as commander of the U.S. 

 crew on the proposed mission, Stafford was in a strong position to 

 brief Teague privately on how the plans were developing and what 

 were the real intentions of the Russians toward the mission. Teague 

 consistently took the position that the flight should be long enough, 

 and loaded with sufficient U.S. scientific experiments so that "if the 

 Russians at the last minute said they were not going, we would have 

 enough experiments on that shot to make it worthwhile." 



On March 7, 1973, Winn began to display a softening of his 

 opposition to Apollo-Soyuz. During questioning of Chester M. Lee, 

 NASA's Program Director of Apollo-Soyuz, Winn remarked: 



I think both Chairman Teague and I are proceeding with caution on some things 

 because we are of the opinion that it may be a one-sided deal where they are basically 

 picking our brains but the more of the hearings I read and also some of the earlier 

 comments by Dale Myers, I am beginning to alter my thinking in that held. I think 

 maybe we are benefiting in more ways than I thought we were going to. 



Fuqua"s questioning in 1973 brought out the fact that $250 million 

 would be the top figure for the project. In addition, most of his ques- 

 tions and observations were favorable. On the other hand, Represent- 

 ative Bill Gunter (Democrat of Florida) was still skeptical. His attitude 

 can be summed up in his question: 



Isn't it true the ultimate end of cooperation, and I'm not against cooperation, 

 Mr. Chairman, is that if we are yards ahead of them, they and their technology are 

 going to benefit more than we? 



On May 1, Teague wrote to NASA Administrator, Dr. Fletcher: 



As the Apollo-Soyuz Test Project is currently constituted serious questions exist 

 as to the value of the American portion of the program if a rendezvous with the 

 Soviet spacecraft is not accomplished for any reason. 



Since failure to rendezvous for either political or technical reasons is a possibility, 

 it is essential that the NASA portion of the mission be capable of making a justifiable, 

 independent, scientific and technological contribution without reliance on a Soviet 

 rendezvous. 



Please advise me as to what steps can be taken by NASA to assure that this 

 objective is obtained. 



Dr. Fletcher replied candidly on May 17 that "I share your 

 concern." He noted that \ \S.\ was reviewing a number of proposed 

 experiments, but "1 do not believe at this time that these experiments 

 could justify a U.S. -only mission." He indicated that "as a result of 

 your inquiry, we are currently studying alternatives that might provide 

 the capability to carry experiments whose scientific and technological 

 return would justify such a U.S. -only mission." But it was also clear 



