\l RON U riCS WD IKA\M'( >KI A I ION 



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after the Texas primary he wouldn't he hack in Congress in 1979, 

 pressed forward for action on NWS in 1978. Milford also expressed 

 this reason for wanting to move ahead: 



Since I was .i professional meteorologist myself for man) years before entering 

 Congress, 1 already had a few ideas as to how the work of the National Weather 

 Service might be improved. 



Brown preferred joint consideration of the two hills, but Milford 

 got his narrower bill reported out of his own subcommittee earlier. 

 On August 8, the full committee met to consider the Milford bill, 

 which had the advantage of administration support since the subcom- 

 mittee had incorporated all the amendments the administration 

 wanted. Milford stated to the full committee: 



The entire NOAA should have a working over, as we have done here with simply 

 one part of NOAA, that being the National Weather Service. This one was picked, 

 quite frankly, for pragmatic reasons. 



Brown told the full committee: 



I personally took the view that it would have been better to move the broader 

 bill. That is not possible. Mr. Milford wants to move with his bill, which is quite 

 right and proper under the circumstances. 



Brown asked that the report include language indicating the desira- 

 bility of a thoroughgoing revision of the Organic Act at the following 

 session, and these recommendations were included. Brown concluded: 



With the understanding that this can be a building block in the broader pro- 

 gram, I would certainly not want to have the committee adversely react to Mr. 

 Milford's bill. 



So the full committee on August 8 unanimously voted out the 

 Milford bill. In Milford's absence, Fuqua took the bill to the House 

 floor under suspension of the rules, and the House passed the bill on 

 September 19 by voice vote. However, the Senate failed to act so the 

 legislation went down the drain in 1978. 



By the end of 1978, the Milford subcommittee had accomplished 

 its objective of further expanding the work of NASA in aeronautical 

 research and development. Similar efforts with FAA had some effect, 

 although the failure of the Senate to go along with Milford's concept 

 of annual authorizations for FAA R. & D. handicapped the subcom- 

 mittee's efforts. The lack of attention to ground propulsion and auto- 

 motive R. & D., along with the bitterly divisive and time-wasting 

 controversy over MLS further limited the influence of the subcommit- 

 tee. The work accomplished in the fields of air traffic control, weather 

 and emphasis on aeronautical R. & D. were the greatest achievements 

 of the subcommittee. 



