195 HISTORY OF THE COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY 



The task for which they gave their lives they knew was worth the sacrifice. 

 This Nation could not honor their memory more than to continue its quest for 

 knowledge. 



In a letter to the members of the Oversight Subcommittee on 

 March 22, 1967, Chairman Teague outlined the scope of the investiga- 

 tion and scheduling of witnesses. He bluntly stated: 



It is my intention to conduct full and complete hearings on all matters relating 

 to the accident. If additional testimony is needed to clarify any issue, such testimony 

 will be taken. However, it is also my intention to complete the hearings as expe- 

 ditiously as possible, including night sessions if necessary, in order that the public 

 may have all the facts as soon as possible, and in order that the United States may 

 get on with the program. * * * 



In view of the recent press coverage concerning alleged statements of inade- 

 quacies in the Apollo program, I am inviting any member of the public, including 

 employees of the Federal Government, to submit to the subcommittee for considera- 

 tion any relevant statement or evidence concerning the subject under inquiry. 



Teague stunned NASA bv his initial reaction to the Review 

 Board report. He said he was "outraged and hurt*' at the carelessness 

 and poor workmanship revealed. He said he was "surprised and dis- 

 appointed at the number of mistakes" by both NASA and North 

 American Aviation, Inc. He labeled the report as "shocking" and 

 "unbelievable" and said it was a "broad indictment" of both NASA 

 and its contractors. Teague followed through on his determination to 

 keep the subcommittee in session mornings, afternoons, and in evening 

 sessions until 10:30 p.m. Staff members like Jim Wilson slept in their 

 offices in the Rayburn Building. It was clear from the chairman's 

 attitude that the inquiry would be thorough and that everybody would 

 get his say. 



The reaction of most members of the Science Committee, and the 

 manner in which they conducted the House investigative hearings, 

 did a great deal to help stabilize the program and public reaction there- 

 to. Some members challenged NASA's decision to set up a primarily 

 internal investigative Board of Review, which Administrator Webb 

 persuaded President Johnson was necessary in order to get the quickest 

 evaluation of what must be done to get the Moon program back on 

 schedule. For example, on the opening day of the hearings, this inter- 

 change took place between Representative Larry Winn, Jr. (Republican 

 of Kansas) and Webb: 



Mr. Winn. Mr. Webb, do you think it might have been wiser now, under the 

 circumstances, and in the face of criticism, to have picked a completely outside 

 investigating board? 



Mr. Winn. No, I do not. I do not think that the United States of America would 

 have as complete information about this accident and all circumstances related to it 

 or be in as good a position to move on with the next phase which is to get ready to 

 fly the Apollo Saturn system. 



