RACING FOR THE MOON 79 



the House committee that his first task was to make a thorough review 

 of the Eisenhower space budget, and the implication was clear that the 

 conclusions would justify stepping up the total effort. Dr. Dryden, who 

 had shocked the select committee in 19^S by downgrading manned 

 flight by comparing it with the circus stunt of shooting a woman out 

 of a cannon, exuded a new spirit of buoyant optimism on March 14 

 as he exulted about the successful suborbital flight of the chimpanzee 

 Ham in a capsule atop a Redstone missile. Dr. Dryden added: 



You will recall that in the budget submitted by Mr. Eisenhower there was a 

 statement that he could see no reason for proceeding beyond Project Mercury. This 

 I think you know is not in accordance with my own recommendations and ideas. 



At the same March 14 House committee hearing, Dr. Seamans 

 made his own position crystal clear: "As an individual, I"m irrevocably 

 committed to pushing the man-in-space program at a maximum speed 

 consistent with budgetary matters and things of that sort." Seamans 

 could sense that "budgetary matters and things of that sort" would 

 soon give a big push to plans which were already being formulated 

 for a speeded-up Moon flight. Dr. Robert Gilruth's Space Task Group, 

 working out of Langley, and George M. Low, at NASA's head- 

 quarters, had underway detailed studies which were far more optimistic 

 than NASA's old 10-year plan which pegged the manned Moon landing 

 as sometime after 1970. 



On April 10, Webb made another appearance before the House 

 Science Committee, telling the House Members that the President was 

 asking $125.6 million more for NASA — most of the stepped-up funds 

 to go toward development of the Saturn booster. 



Webb was followed on April 11 by George Low, who brought the 

 committee up to date on Project Mercury. Low clashed with Miller 

 on the issue of whether the January 31, 1961, flight of the chimpanzee 

 "Ham" had been a success, as listed by Low on a huge chart he showed 

 the committee. Miller challenged Low in sharp terms: 



Mr. Miller. In the case of "Ham," that was the January 31 flight that you 

 showed as successful there? 



Mr. Low. Yes, sir. 



Mr. Miller. Wasn't there a condition there where you had planned on one orbit 

 and something went wrong and you kicked him out 120 miles further? 



Mr. Low. We went about 120 miles farther than planned. 



Mr. Miller. Shouldn't this be put down as a failure for the booster? 



Mr. Low. Perhaps I should add another column to this chart for the booster, to 

 indicate its performance. 



Mr. MlLLER. I think you should. I think you are trying to fool us. 



Mr. Low. I am not 



Mr. Miller. I suggest you correct the chart before it goes into the record. 



[The chart printed in the hearing record still listed the flight as a success, with 

 the notation: "Booster difficulties resulted in longer range than planned.'' 



