DECISION ON THE SPA< I SHUTTLE 



303 



been the development of its main engines. Fuqua observed that man- 

 agement problems dominated the early phases of the Shuttle develop- 

 ment, and gradually as nine went on they were intermixed with 

 engineering problems. The decision to use existing facilities, on which 

 the committee insisted, saved millions of dollars and as many headaches 

 for the program. 



SUPPLEMENTAL FOR SHUTTLE 



On March 28, 1979, Fuqua addressed the House on the first of two 

 big monetarv deficits which plagued the Shuttle in 1979- He told the 

 House that unless NASA received an $185 million supplemental shot 

 in the arm, there would be a 4-6 months' delay in the first orbital 

 launch and more than $1 billion of additional costs to NASA. The 

 tight budget restrictions which had kept NASA's spending within 10 

 percent of the original estimates "have required pushing testing to 

 late in the program and consequently difficult technical problems have 

 been encountered and are being overcome later in the development 

 cycle", Fuqua told his colleagues. Winn added that "nearly half of 

 the 42,000 contractor personnel would be laid off" if the $185 million 

 supplemental were not enacted. He made this observation on the man- 

 agement of the program : 



The very nature of this program has the potential of many serious impairments 

 and setbacks. In spite of this huge potential, however, this program is within 6 to 

 12 months of the original 1971 schedule and 10 percent of the original cost. I submit 

 to you that there cannot be any mismanagement when a program of this magnitude 

 and complexity is as close as it is to the original plan. 



Wvdler also stressed the bipartisan nature of the support for the 

 increased funding. Nelson and Flippo also spoke for authorizing the 

 additional $185 million, which passed by the topheavy vote of 354-39. 



ADDITIONAL FUNDS REQUIRED 



Not until after the passage of the supplemental authorization by 

 the House did NASA notify the committee that several hundred 

 million dollars more would be needed in 1979 and 1980 to meet un- 

 foreseen problems. The 1979 funds were subsequently reprogramed 

 from production funds. Committee members were understandably 

 angered that NASA officials had assured the committee in January and 

 February that the supplemental would be enough to keep the Shuttle- 

 on schedule. As soon as he learned the shocking news, Fuqua on May 

 4, 1979 ordered a review of NASA's operating procedures and manage- 

 ment practices and scheduled Shuttle hearings for June 28, 1979. 



