HISTORY OF TH1 COMMUTE! ON SCIENC1 AND TECHNOLOGY 



which might help solve some of the critical fuel problems confronted 

 by tanners and those living in rural areas: 



here today will live long enough to see the end of petroleum us 

 tuel. It is much tiio precious to he wasted this way and it will he needed to equip and 

 stoc k the petrochemical industry I think this is dn absolute certainty. \1\ disappoint- 

 ment is that more is not being done .it the Federal level in coordinating various 

 alternative energy sources, power sources, that do not rely on petroleum. 



WAITING ON ERDA 



The classic response, with the gray eminence of OMB in the back- 

 ground, came in EPA's official rejection of the Brown bill. In a letter 

 to Teague on February 11. 1974, EPA laid down the administration 

 line, which was that everything must wait organizationally until the 

 establishment of the Energy Research and Development Administra- 

 tion (ERDA). The official line was: 



(The Brown hill), by enabling NASA to establish its own automotive research 

 programs, sepal ate from those of other agencies, would only further segment existing 

 efforts and trigger an undesirable inter-agency competition for available funds and 

 manpower. Accordingly, since we find (the Brown bill) ill-advised from an organiza- 

 tional standpoint, we do not favor us enactment. 



brown's response to this form of myopia was restrained when he 

 addressed the issue in the June hearings on his bill: 



1 am somewhat concerned that administrative questions will obscure the fact 

 th.u the existing ground transportation system in the United States is near collapse. 

 This system is based upon the private automobile, which itself is based upon the 

 energy-consuming and pollution-plagued internal combustion engine. 



Brown could see little prospect that Detroit would take any initiative 

 to move toward solution of the problem, either of pollution or fuel 

 conservation, without Federal development of demonstrated tech- 

 nology and some prodding. Brown told the Symington subcommittee: 



The impact of the automobile upon the American economy is too pervasive and 

 too important to trust the future of our Nation to the decisions made in Detroit. 



Symington was equally pessimistic that a solution could be found in 

 agencies like the Department of Transportation. He summarized: 



We asked the Department of Transportation what they thought of Mr. Brown's 

 hill, and what they thought their obligations were with respect to the automobile 

 industry. They testified they think it is up to Detroit to make the innovations neces- 

 sary to conserve fuel. * * * The Department of Transportation apparently believes 

 thai the automobile industry even in its narrow interests will somehow address itself 

 to the needs of the 1980's. * * * We are skeptical. 



The hearings afforded an opportunity to get a glimpse of what was 

 being done by NASA already on a small-scale experimental basis at 

 such research centers as Lewis and the Jet Propulsion Laboratory. 

 J PL Director Dr. William H. Pickering briefed the committee on 



