122 HISTORY OF THE COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY 



species — a nonlawyer — was drafted to join the group. The Daddario 

 subcommittee recommended that NASA should have more flexibility 

 in determining whether to obtain a royalty-free license on each inven- 

 tion developed in the course of NASA research contracts, or to try to 

 obtain full title. In separate views differing from the majority, Repre- 

 sentative William Fitts Ryan (Democrat of New York) advocated 

 continuation of the policy set forth in the 1958 act as the best pro- 

 tector of the public interest. 



In practice, NASA interpreted the 1958 act liberally, which 

 quieted many of the fears of aerospace contractors. 



Although strongly favoring the Daddario committee recommen- 

 dations, NASA did confess it was not really having any "major diffi- 

 culties" with the 1958 Act. So it was not the end of the world for the 

 space program when Congress, despite the favorable committee recom- 

 mendation, failed to take action in either the House or Senate to 

 implement the report. In fact, the Space Act itself was never changed 

 to reflect the Daddario committee's recommendations. 



What makes the Daddario committee recommendations significant, 

 however, is the fact that President Kennedy on October 10, 1963, 

 issued a memorandum on patent policy which paralleled and restated 

 many of the Daddario committee recommendations. The memorandum 

 stipulated that all Federal agencies with work performed under Gov- 

 ernment contract would normally be guided by the terms of the memo- 

 randum. Therefore, even though the extensive labors of the Mitchell 

 and Daddario subcommittees were not actually frozen into statute, 

 they did serve as sounding boards for patent policy and also surfaced 

 in statements of Presidential directive which stood, with only minor 

 subsequent revisions by President Nixon. 



In the happy-go-lucky early days of the space program, NASA 

 sent up to Capitol Hill a bill which they insisted was necessary to 

 provide the "flexibility" for emergency construction during periods 

 when the slow congressional funding process might really put a crimp 

 in speedy progress. Thus originated the authority to reprogram R. & D. 

 into construction not to exceed 3 percent. The committee soon dis- 

 covered that reprograming was going on at a merry pace, so in the 

 authorization bill passed in 1963, the reprograming limit was cut 

 down to 2 percent — and subsequently squeezed down to % of 1 

 percent by degrees over the years. Also, the committee had moved to 

 require NASA to give House and Senate committees 30 days' notice 

 before reprograming would become effective, unless approval were 

 given immediately prior to the expiration of the 30 days. Those actions 

 tightened the reins of oversight available to the committee, enabled 

 the committee to review and assess reprograming recommendations, 



