GEMINI AND APOLLO 



197 



A majority of the Science Committee defended Webb's decision, 

 particularly in view of the thoroughness of the Board of Review 

 report, which was completed in minute detail and combed over 

 thoroughly by the committee both in public hearings and on-the-spot 

 investigations at Cape Kennedy on April 21, 1967. 



On the opening day of the committee hearing, Science Committee 

 members clashed with Webb over his allegation that appropriation 

 cuts had caused the deficiencies which the Board of Review pointed 

 out. Daddario, in particular, documented the fact that there was no 

 evidence to bear this out, and, furthermore, that the most severe 

 reductions had occurred at the Bureau of the Budget level. 



Members were angered at the suggestion by a North American 

 Aviation witness that Grissom may have kicked a wire to cause the 

 spark which ignited the fire. Representative William Fitts Ryan 

 (Democrat of New York), Representative James G. Fulton (Republican 

 of Pennsylvania), and others pointed out that Grissom would have 

 had to be a contortionist to have kicked the wire. 



The news coverage of both the fire and the investigation was as 

 intense as the fire itself, and no doubt prompted some members of the 

 committee to take very critical stances to attract publicity. Ryan, in 

 particular, conducted a vendetta against NASA on virtually every 

 point which the press seemed interested in headlining. On the other 

 hand, NASA bungled its own public relations with reference to the 

 so-called Phillips report. At first NASA denied it existed, then refused 

 to release it, then tried to indicate it had acted fully on its recom- 

 mendations. 



THE PHILLIPS REPORT 



Maj. Gen. Samuel C. Phillips of the Air Force, as NASA's trouble- 

 shooting program director of the Apollo program in the Office of 

 Manned Space Flight, presented to North American Aviation, Inc., 

 a caustic review of management deficiencies as a result of his 1965 

 investigations. In a covering letter dated December 16, 1965, to J. L. 

 Atwood, President of North American Aviation, General Phillips had 

 made these comments concerning poor quality control and inferior 

 workmanship on the Apollo spacecraft and Saturn: 



I am definitely not satisfied with the progress and outlook of either program and 

 am convinced that the right actions now can result in substantial improvement of 

 position in both programs in the relatively near future. 



Enclosed are ten copies of the notes which we compiled on the basis of our visits. 

 Thev include details not discussed in our briefing and are provided for your considera- 

 tion and use. 



The conclusions expressed in our briefing and notes are critical. Even with due 

 consideration of hopeful signs, I could not find a substantive basis for confidence in 

 future performance. 



