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HISTORY OF THE COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY 



By 1965, the first launch of Surveyor had already slipped by 

 2% years. The first flight actually occurred on May 30, 1966. 



Once again, as with the Ranger probe, Chairman Miller authorized 

 Oversight Subcommittee Chairman Teague to allow Karth to chair 

 the hearings to investigate Surveyor. Karth took his subcommittee 

 on a two-day inspection tour of the Jet Propulsion Laboratory at Pasa- 

 dena, and then on to the Hughes Aircraft Co. plant in Culver City, 

 Calif., on September 2 and 3, 1965. 



The Surveyor spacecraft weighed 2,250 pounds, stood 10 feet 

 high, and had a triangular frame with a landing leg on each of the 

 three corners. A solid propellant retrorocket engine was designed to 

 slow it down as it approached the Moon's surface. A television camera 

 and a surface sampler were among the experiments aboard, enabling 

 a measurement of the physical and chemical properties of the lunar 

 surface to a two-foot depth under the eyes of the television camera. 



The Karth hearings reviewed the stormy history of the project, 

 involving many design modifications and bitter disputes among 

 NASA, JPL, and Hughes. The committee found that the repeated 

 technical difficulties had been compounded by poor management and 

 supervision all along the line. In 1964, after NASA reviewed the short- 

 comings at JPL and Hughes, NASA had recommended that JPL assign 

 more personnel to monitor Hughes. The result was an increase of 

 JPL personnel supervising Hughes from 100 to 500, in what can only 

 be described as "intensive surveillance" which further strained the 

 JPL-Hughes relationship. While NASA was trying to pressure JPL 

 to take a more aggressive supervisory role over Hughes, the Hughes 

 organization resented the "new ideas" which slowed down their 

 work. 



The committee uncovered the fact that two "drop test" failures 

 contributed to escalating costs. The following colloquy points up 

 some of the multiple problems involved in the tests, the contractual 

 relationships and the responsibility: 



Mr. Mosher. When you were talking about these Surveyor drop tests, it seemed 

 to me there was an implied criticism when you said you found that they were not 

 using flight quality hardware. Now, who were you criticizing at that point? Whose 

 fault was this? 



Dr. Newell. I think the Hughes contractor agrees that these tests weren't 

 prepared for or conducted properly 



Mr. Mosher. Is there any penalty here? In our contract with Hughes, is there 

 any comeback that the Government has with Hughes in this respect? 



Dr. Newell. We didn't have an incentive contract at that time; no. 



Mr. Mosher. This was a cost-plus arrangement? 



Dr. Newell. Yes, cost-plus fixed fee. 



Mr. Conable. But you arc moving mere toward incentive contracts, aren't 

 you? 



