DE< ISION ON THE SPACE SHITTLE 299 



designs which have been submitted in confidence to the Administra- 

 tion bv any person, firm or institution" or might result in release of 

 information to foreign competitors. Mrs. Abzug pointed out that the 

 Freedom of Information Act fullv protects both trade secrets and the 

 national security, and she submitted an amendment to delete the offend- 

 ing section. Chairman Teague, after consultation with the House 

 Government Operations Committee which administers the Freedom 

 of Information Act, accepted the Abzug amendment. 



Representative Herman Badillo (^Democrat of New York) noted 

 that "President Ford has asked Congress to hold the line on spending, 

 exercise fiscal restraint, and enact no new social welfare programs, 

 vet would provide more than $1 billion for research and development 

 of a Space Shuttle." But neither Badillo nor any other Member of 

 the House offered any amendment in 1975 to cut the Shuttle authoriza- 

 tion, a signal that the Shuttle expenditure was generally supported 

 and well justified through the committee's leadership. 



AUSTERITY HITS THE SHUTTLE 



The effect of funding cuts in 1974 and 1975 produced a 15-month 

 slippage in the Shuttle schedule, pushing the first planned orbital flight 

 farther down the road. The stretch-out in schedule also increased the 

 projected total research and development cost from $5-15 billion to 

 $5.22 billion, in 1971 dollars. Bv 1979, cost was over $6 billion. 



In 1976, NASA's budget request was cut $182.6 million by the 

 Office of Management and Budget. Most of this cut was sustained by 

 the research and development area, and of course had its effect in 

 the development of the Space Shuttle as well. One of the challenges 

 faced bv the committee was how to insure that safety, reliability, 

 good management and cost controls could be achieved with a minimum 

 adverse effect on the scheduling. Fuqua remarked during the floor 

 debate on the NASA authorization bill in 1976: 



In the past year, detailed reviews were made to assure us that our program was 

 both technically sound and cost efFective. As a result, some tests were deleted and 

 deferred * * *. Too much testing can be costly * * *. In the case of the Shuttle, NASA 

 deleted some large module testing. In these cases, the tests were found to be redundant, 

 or alternate verification methods were defined which were more cost efFective. 



Winn, the ranking Republican on the subcommittee, observed in 



1976: 



NASA's Space Shuttle program remains within cost and schedule despite budget- 

 ary constraints and past deferrals. During our series of field hearings, I became con- 

 vinced that the morale of NASA personnel and their principal contractors is quite 

 high in the face of these pressures, and they are doing an excellent job on the Shuttle 



According to Frey: 



