304 HISTORY OF THE COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY 



The atmosphere was tense when Dr. Frosch and the contractor 

 representatives assembled in 2318 Rayburn on June 28. Fuqua and Winn 

 reiterated their strong and continuing support for the Shuttle, but 

 made no bones about their displeasure with the failure of NASA to 

 communicate the problem. Winn put it most sharply: 



The apparent cost over-runs which have been incurred could have profound effects 

 on the entire space program, not just the Space Shuttle. The political controversies 

 that will occur because of these over-runs will continue for some rime and may do 

 irreparable damage to the integrity of NASA as a mission-oriented agency. * * * 



After spending all of these years traveling from one briefing on Shuttle status to 

 the next, 1 feel like I have totally wasted my time. The visits gave me the confidence to 

 go before my colleagues in the House of Representatives and fight for the necessary- 

 support to move this program along. I can see now that it was a false sense of 

 confidence. 



Dr. Frosch explained simply that "it has been necessary for us to 

 spend more resources to accomplish the development program than we 

 had planned", requiring an additional $220 million as a budget amend- 

 ment to the regular authorization bill passed in 1979. Even with these 

 additional funds, NASA estimated that the first manned orbiting 

 Shuttle flight would be delayed from its projected November 1979 date 

 until 1980. Dr. Frosch added: 



Early in the Space Shuttle program NASA established a philosophy of maintain- 

 ing an austere budget environment. Budgetary reserves were maintained at Head- 

 quarters and only utilized after review by the highest levels of management. This was 

 a different philosophy than used in Apollo, in which reserves were approved and main- 

 tained at lower levels of management. 



The unforeseen developments raised the total cost of the Shuttle 

 to over $6 billion in 1971 dollars, which was about 20 percent above 

 initial estimates. These events resulted in a tightening of NASA's 

 management control, as well as a much closer oversight by the com- 

 mittee through its visits to NASA centers and more frequent and 

 franker communication with both headquarters and field personnel, as 

 well as contractors. 



Although NASA had a reserve fund known as "Allowance for 

 Program Adjustments" (APA), Dr. John Yardley, NASA's Associate 

 Administrator for Space Transportation explained it this way in his 

 colloquy with Fuqua: 



We also, I will have to confess, thought we were getting a little pressure from 

 Marshall and Kennedy to get in and get some of the APA before Johnson and Rock- 

 well used it all up, if you want me to be brutally frank. So we were somewhat sus- 

 picious of the inputs at this time. They were pretty fuzzy. 



Mr. Fuqua. There was a raid on the cookie jar? 



Mr. Yardley. Right. 



Winn added this graphic comment: 



It seems to me that you guvs were drowning, but you didn't really know you 

 were drowning so you didn't yell tor help. 



