SHOOTOUT AT CLINCH RIVER g87 



and allow any self-serving individual or self-serving group to pin some "holier than 

 thou" label upon themselves, such as "environmentalist" and then assume the right 

 to tell the rest of us that they have some special privilege to determine what is best 

 for the environment, and that those with whom they disagree are not interested in 

 environmental protection. 



ARRANGING A MEETING WITH THE PRESIDENT 



Despite the adverse vote in the committee, Teague decided that 

 the only course of action was to press forward with the Flowers com- 

 promise. It was evident that one of the biggest power blocs opposing 

 the Flowers compromise was the nuclear industry. Teague reasoned 

 that if he could persuade both President Carter and the top officials of 

 the nuclear industry to sit down around the cabinet table in a summit 

 meeting, there might be a chance to come closer toward a mutual 

 understanding and perhaps break the deadlock. Teague's initiative was 

 expressed in a May 10 letter to over a dozen executives, the bosses of 

 the Washington representatives with whom he had been dealing. He 

 wrote: 



There is an imperative need for you, and for the principal officers of other major 

 firms interested in the future of nuclear energy to recognize the hard realities of the 

 present deadlock here in Washington concerning development of breeder reactors. 



That deadlock must be broken constructively before there can be any hope of 

 further progress in developing a vigorous U.S. breeder program. 



Teague stated that unless a positive compromise could be negotiated, 

 along with strong support, "another whole year or more will be 

 wasted without decisive action toward the actual construction and 

 demonstration of a breeder reactor." He also said that he was con- 

 vinced the best way to obtain an agreement was to arrange a face-to- 

 face discussion with President Carter and Secretary Schlesinger. Teague 

 told the executives that he was "glad to act as a catalytic agent in 

 attempting to arrange such a conference at the earliest feasible date." 

 He asked each executive to telephone, and received a favorable response. 

 On May 22, President Carter visited Oak Ridge, but if either sup- 

 porters or opponents of CRBR expected any word of advice from him 

 they were disappointed. He skirted the issue completely. Wydler 

 called it "a nontrip." The only remote mention of the issue was a sign 

 outside the auditorium where the President spoke, which read: 



Get off your tractor 

 Start the reactor 



MOVING OFF DEAD CENTER 



A few days after the President returned from Oak Ridge, Teague 

 wrote him a lengthy letter reviewing the developments of 1978 and 



