NATIRA1 K1m»I Ri is AND THF. ENVIRONMENT 



979 



This exchange with Hal Hollister, ERDA's Deputy Assistant Ad- 

 ministrator for Environment and Safety, illustrated Brown's method 

 of approach : 



Mr. Brown: Our purpose this morning was to create a confrontation between 

 the agencies, and some outsiders who have a relatively objective point of view, in 

 order perhaps to spark a few clashes on this matter of coordination. We may or may 

 not have succeeded. 



Mr. Hollister: I think that this subcommittee has been extremely helpful, and 

 has done a service not only to the two agencies (ERDA and EPA) but to the Nation's 

 energy program .is .1 whole, by asking the kinds of questions being raised. 



Early in 1977, the Brown subcommittee had to do some fire brigade 

 work. The Carter administration sent down some proposals to defer 

 expenditures in the environment and safety area. Brown and Lloyd of 

 California successfully put through the necessary House resolution of 

 disapproval to insure that these vital expenditures go forward. 



ENVIRONMENTAL IMPLICATIONS OF ENERGY PLAN 



When President Carter unveiled his National Energy Plan on 

 April 20, 1977, it set off a large number of initiatives by the Brown 

 subcommittee. The environment and safety implications of stepping 

 up the use of coal and nonplutonium based nuclear power immediately 

 raised the question of whether existing environmental R. & D. pro- 

 grams were adequate to meet these new challenges. Brown stated on 

 June 7, on the eve of subcommittee hearings called to examine the 

 issues: 



A change in directions as profound as that presented by the President's energy 

 plan demands a thorough re-analysis of the research, development and demonstration 

 programs in the environmental area. Our committee has the responsibility of seeing 

 whether environmental research program resources and emphasis are appropriate for 

 judging effects and protecting the environment from harmful aspects of energy 

 production. 



Producers, consumers, environmentalists, industry representatives, 

 Federal and State officials and outside witnesses aired the implica- 

 tions of the President's National Energy Plan in the June 1977 hear- 

 ings. Brown adopted the adjective "foresight" — rather than over- 

 sight — to describe the hearings which the subcommittee kicked off in 

 June. Based upon these foresight hearings, the subcommittee also held 

 detailed public inquiries into the adequacy and appropriateness of 

 environmental and health programs related to both the nuclear and 

 fossil fuel cycles. As the coal fuel cycle hearings started in July, Brown 

 observed: 



Either the C0 2 -greenhouse effect or the adverse health effects of burning coal 

 could change our decision on this basic aspect of President Carter's program, yet at 



