RACING FOR THE MOON 



87 



important national issue,' and that the American people, Congress, and 

 the President would have to decide whether it was in the national 

 interest * * * Mr. Seamans confirmed reports that the administration 

 had refused funds requested by his agency for development and fabri- 

 cation of the Apollo capsule. The space agency, he said, asked for an 

 overall budget of $1.4 billion but had its request cut bv $182 million 

 bv the administration." 



Seamans relates that the President was very upset "that some 

 minion of his that he didn't know was talking about going to the 

 Moon, and I thought it might be the end of my existence at NASA." 

 As a matter of fact, Seamans' job was in real jeopardy as a result of the 

 incident. But the Gagarin flight, the testimonv before the House 

 Science Committee and the issue of what must be done to restore 

 America's badly bruised prestige spurred the President to focus on the 

 space program and lunar landing in the next few weeks. 



With this backdrop. President Kennedy called Vice President 

 Johnson to his office April 19. The next day, the same day Congress 

 approved the legislation to make Johnson Chairman of the Space 

 Council, the President wrote a memorandum to his Vice President 

 commencing: "In accordance with our conversation, I would like for 

 you as Chairman of the Space Council to be in charge of making an 

 overall survey of where we stand in space." By April 19, the abortive 

 Bay of Pigs invasion had degenerated into a total failure, and historians 

 will argue how much this defeat may have related to the lunar landing 

 decision. On April 21, the President in a press conference stated 

 bluntly: "If we can set to the Moon before the Russians, then we 

 should." 



While Johnson was holding almost nonstop conferences to assem- 

 ble the best advice from sources both within and outside the Govern- 

 ment, the House Science Committee continued to hold daily hearings 

 on the NASA budget. In addition to fine-tooth combing that budget, 

 the House committee continued to press very hard for a general 

 speedup in the entire space program. This pressure certainly was not 

 lost on NASA officials making their frequent appearances by day and 

 relaying their assessments bv night. By April 28, Johnson had a pre- 

 liminary memorandum ready for the President, recommending a 

 manned lunar landing as the centerpiece of the space program 



Early n May, activity intensified on both ends of Pennsylvania 

 Avenue. Johnson telephoned many Congressmen to learn whether they 

 would support a greatly accelerated step-up in the space program; he- 

 was encouraged to receive enthusiastic bipartisan support. In response 

 to Johnson's request, Chairman Brooks submitted a 10-page memoran- 

 dum entitled "Recommendations re the National Space Program," 



