190 



HISTORY OF THE COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY 



We were fully aware of our responsibility to the Nation to economize * * *. 

 During the hearings, we probed the justification for each line item. We were guided 

 by this question: "Is each budget item absolutely justified on its own merits to meet 

 minimum program needs for fiscal year 1966?" We questioned each witness extensively 

 in an attempt to uncover soft areas or unjustified expenses. 



One measure of the effectiveness of the presentation was the fact that 

 in 1965 the committee was rewarded by a 389 to 11 majority on the 

 authorization bill. 



FUTURE PLANNING 



Over four years before Neil Armstrong first set foot on the Moon, 

 Chairman Miller and Subcommittee Chairman Teague became con- 

 cerned about planning for future programs beyond the lunar landing. 

 Miller delegated the responsibility for planning studies to the Sub- 

 committee on Oversight, headed by Teague. From March through 

 June 1965, Teague dispatched letters to all the NASA centers asking 

 them to set forth their goals for the future. Similar letters were sent 

 to all major aerospace contractors, and the replies poured in through- 

 out 1965 and early 1966. Replies were also solicited from Ed Welsh at 

 the National Aeronautics and Space Council, from the Space Science 

 Board of the National Academy of Sciences, and the Department of 

 Defense. 



With well over 400,000 people employed in 20,000 companies 

 throughout the country working on the space program, billions of 

 dollars invested in facilities and equipment, and very expensive and 

 sophisticated hardware and flight systems available, there was a deep 

 interest in what would happen after Apollo. Jim Wilson and the staff 

 of the Oversight Subcommittee held a lengthy brainstorming session 

 with Drs. Seamans, Mueller, and the top NASA brass on September 2, 

 1965. 



When Webb appeared before the Science Committee for authoriza- 

 tion hearings early in 1966, he confessed that funding for future plan- 

 ning and post-Apollo programs had been severely slashed by the 

 Bureau of the Budget, reflecting the President's decision "to hold 

 open for another year the major decisions on future programs- 

 decisions on whether to make use of the space operational systems, 

 space know-how, and facilities we have worked so hard to build up 

 or to begin their liquidation." Teague made no secret of his dis- 

 pleasure with Webb's testimony on March 10, 1966: 



I daily become more disturbed at the attitude of the executive branch of the 

 Government as to whether they really want an aggressive program like we should 

 be carrying out, and why we should wait another year to make major decisions, 

 I don't understand. To me it is like telling a child that we are going to make you 

 crawl another year before you can walk * * *. 



