194 HISTORY OF THE COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY 



searching inquiries which the committee and the staff repeatedly made 

 were all based on the assumptions that the program was a sound 

 one and that someone was asking the right questions. The danger of 

 lire was recognized, and studies were made on space rescue, but they 

 were primarily directed at rescue in space. Few, if any, in NASA, on 

 the committee or anywhere in the country ever asked the question 

 which occurred to everyone by hindsight: Why was a lot of flammable 

 material allowed in a pure oxygen pressurized atmosphere at a time 

 when the secured hatch made it so difficult and time consuming to 

 escape? 



Apollo I was scheduled to fly with its premier crew of Virgil 

 "Gus" Grissom, Edward White, and Roger Chaffee in February 1967. 

 All three astronauts were strapped down in the spacecraft, simulating 

 a launch, in their bulky space suits. A scheduled test of "emergency 

 egress practice" was on the list but by 6:30 p.m. on January 27, 1967, 

 they had not quite reached that point on the checkout. After the 

 hatch on Grissom's Liberty Bell 7 Mercury capsule had prematurely 

 blown off just after his splashdown, nearly drowning him, it was 

 decided to design the Apollo hatches so they could not be blown off 

 with explosive bolts. Hence it took a very strong man at least 90 

 seconds to turn the lever and lift the hatch from the inside. 



In Fort Worth, Tex., on January 27, Teague addressed 2,000 high 

 school seniors at a Career Conference at Texas Christian University. 

 As examples of outstanding careers, he introduced Audie Murphy, 

 the most decorated soldier in World War II; his son, Jack, an Air 

 Force jet pilot; ail-American football star Eddie LeBaron; and Astronaut 

 Vance Brand. Teague and Brand were having dinner in Fort Worth 

 that evening when they received the stunning news that a fire in the 

 spacecraft had snuffed out the lives of three of their good personal 

 friends. NASA Administrator Webb telephoned Teague with the 

 grim news. 



Immediately after the tragic fire, and during the investigations 

 which followed, the attitudes and decisions of the Science Committee 

 were very significant in their effect on the future of Apollo and the 

 entire space program. In some quarters there was a feeling after the 

 fire that the entire Moon flight program should be reappraised, 

 stretched out and changed in emphasis. Had the accident occurred in 

 space without sufficient means to investigate the circumstances, it is 

 probable that the effect would have dealt an even more serious blow 

 to the program. But the members of the Science Committee immediately 

 rallied to the defense of the program after the tire. 



This occurred in several ways. On the day following the tire, most 

 members of the committee were interviewed by the news media. The 



