DECISION ON Mil SPACE SHUTTLE 305 



To this, Dr. Frosch responded: 



It is always a question of difficult judgment as to when you cross the line between 

 crying wolf because you think something might happen and informing people 

 because you're prettv sure something might happen. 



On August 30, 1979, Chairman Fuqua released a report of the Sub- 

 committee on Space Science and Applications which took both NASA 

 and Space Shuttle contractor management to task for their shortcomings 

 in assessing Shuttle budget requirements. In releasing the report, 

 Fuqua noted : 



The Space Shuttle program has been austere from the very beginning and program 

 reserves have been inadequate to cope with cost growths and schedule delays, which 

 have resulted from work deferrals from one year to the next throughout the life of 

 the program. 



Winn stated: 



I have been very displeased with the financial planning that has taken place in 

 the past year. There is no doubt in my mind that NASA has the capability to effec- 

 tivelv manage the Shuttle program and develop realistic financial estimates. However, 

 this recent cost overrun is a drastic mistake in these times of fiscal austerity. I hope- 

 NASA will draw upon their capability to provide more realistic cost estimates in 

 the future. 



On a more positive note, the subcommittee report expressed con- 

 fidence in the integrity of the system design of the Space Shuttle pro- 

 gram. Fuqua warned that "NASA must demonstrate and reestablish 

 its credibility with regard to controlling cost growth and forecasting 

 budget requirements." The report recommended that an annual 

 financial assessment of the Space Shuttle program be conducted above 

 the level of NASA's Office of Space Transportation Systems. 



At the subcommittee's fall program review of the Space Shuttle 

 program on October 18, 1979, Wydler remarked: 



I am deeply worried about what is happening to the Space Shuttle. * * * it could 

 well mean serious difficulties for our national space program in the years ahead. My 

 feeling is that we haven't got this program under control, that we really don't know 

 when we are going to be ready to fly, that the cost overruns are well in the neighbor- 

 hood of about a billion dollars 



The final chapter has not yet been written on the success or failure 

 of committee oversight on the Shuttle, as the first manned orbital 

 flight has, as of this writing, not yet occurred. But the record of the 

 1970's is an instructive and revealing account of how a congressional 

 committee grappled with a totally new program in a highly technical 

 field where the targets were always moving at incredible speeds. 



