SCIF.NC.F. IN Till WHIT1 HOUSE 61 1 



vice president of McGraw-Hill, Inc., including both Government and 

 non-Government experts in the held. The study was entitled "Problems 

 of Communication in Large Cities." 



As if the subcommittee didn't have enough to worry about, they 

 also poked around in the held of "interdisciplinary research," defined 

 by Daddario as follows: 



By this I mean research that combines the intellectual and informational re- 

 sources of the life, physical and social sciences and engineering. 



Once again, the Science Policy Research Division was asked for a 

 report on the issue. The study was published as a committee print in 

 October 1970, entitled, "Interdisciplinary Research — An Exploration 

 of Public Policy Issues." 



NEW TECHNOLOGICAL OPPORTUNITIES 



In the fall of 1971, after the Congress had voted down the super- 

 sonic transport program, President Nixon designated William Ma- 

 gruder, who had been Program Director for the SST at the Federal 

 Aviation Administration, to work in the White House. Magruder was 

 named Presidential Consultant on Technology. He helped work up 

 the new technological opportunities program, the outlines of which 

 President Nixon unveiled to the Congress in September 1971. Mosher 

 was optimistic that at last the White House was turning its attention 

 to the 1970 recommendations of the subcommittee concerning a na- 

 tional science policy, and meeting the need for central, coordinating 

 control in the White House. Despite the publicity which accompanied 

 the new technological opportunities program which Magruder helped 

 develop, when the bells rang and the whistles blew on New Year's 

 Eve, nobody was waiting around for the President to drop the other 

 shoe and proclaim a national science policy "no later than December 

 31, 1971." 



On April 26, 1972, the National Science Board presented its annual 

 report in public hearings before the subcommittee. The Board's report, 

 entitled "The Role of Engineers and Scientists in a National Policy 

 for Technology," really did not go very far toward meeting the pre- 

 scriptions of the subcommittee so far as either a national science 

 policy or strengthening the White House scientific machinery were 

 concerned. In its hearings on the NSB report, the subcommittee did 

 very little to focus attention on these long-range imperatives. As a 

 matter of fact, most of the discussion when NSB appeared before the 

 committee related to Bell's concern that the RANN program in NSF 

 was not being given enough emphasis. 



