614 HISTORY OF THE COMMI'I 111 ON S< 1! M I AND TECHNOLOGY 



committee would emerge some kind of a joint proposal which could be 

 endorsed bv both ends of Pennsylvania Avenue. Privately, it was not 

 anticipated that much could be gained toward restoring the scientific 

 machinerv in the White House until President Nixon's successor took 

 office— thought to be 33^ years hence. There was a timeless outlook 

 which motivated Teague and his top staff in planning and conducting 

 the hearings, as contrasted with those whose natural instincts were 

 confrontation, criticism, and challenge. 



When Dr. Edward E. David, President Nixon's former science 

 adviser, testified before the committee on July 24, he observed: 



Let me answer a question that has been asked me often since leaving the White 

 House. Has science been downgraded? My answer is "no"! 



He did concede: 



The direct influence of science on societal affairs has. 



But the longer he was away from his White House job, the more can- 

 did Dr. David became. He was quoted at the January 27, 1975, annual 

 meeting of the American Association for the Advancement of Science 

 as stating: 



There was definitely a falling out between the scientific community and the 

 President. One thing you can do if you want to reform an institution is to get rid 

 of it. The White House advisers to Mr. Nixon thought that the scientists were using 

 science as a sledgehammer to grind their political axes. 



SYMINGTON AND GOLDWATER ARE CRITICAL 



By the close of the July 1973 hearings, other committee members 

 started to get more critical. Symington said at the close of the first 

 phase of the hearings: 



It does appear from everything I see before me that the channel for communi- 

 cation is rather scattered at the moment. No one is really there to help the President. 

 What Dr. Stever may have to say is somewhat chopped up by Mr. Shultz, or the 

 possibility exists that his advice will wind up in some obscure office in OMB. 



Goldwater reiterated his conviction that "the scientific community 

 would be better served if the director were to report directly to the 

 President." But the most damning indictment of the reorganization 

 came from the last witness who testified in July, William D. Carey, 

 vice president of Arthur D. Little, Inc., and for over a quarter of a 

 century a Bureau of the Budget official. Carey labeled the move as "an 

 impulsive and mistaken decision." His analysis was: 



In terming it a mistake, I do so on objective grounds, believing that the Presi- 

 dency needs staff resources to deal with the problems of choice affecting civil and 

 military technology, arms control, environmental regulation, biomedical technology, 

 and energy R. & D. strategies. By divesting the Presidency of PSAC and OST and 

 diluting the intensity if not the quality of scientific and technical counsel, the implic- 



