SCIENCE IN THE WHITE HOUSE 617 



Teague strongly endorsed Dr. Killian's suggestion. 



As a result of all this, the committee had advice running out its 

 ears. There were reams of questions, observations, challenges, and 

 admonitions, with a foreboding undercurrent of uncertainty about the 

 future status of science and technology in a period of budget squeeze 

 and administrative (not to mention political) uncertainties. Whether 

 or not the country was, in President Nixon's words, "wallowing in 

 Watergate," it was occupying an inordinate amount of time and 

 energy, sapping the national leadership sorely needed. 



THE CONGRESSIONAL ROLE IN SCIENCE POLICY 



One interesting section of the analysis by the American Associa- 

 tion for the Advancement of Science dealt with "Congressional Re- 

 sponsibility," stating: 



It is important to stress the need for a stronger Congressional counterpart in the 

 development of national science policy. * * * We feel that a continuous Congres- 

 sional examination of the entire range of science policy issues is necessary. What was 

 lost in science policy cohesiveness in the executive branch of the government, may 

 be regained by new Congressional initiative. 



The AAAS report also recommended an annual report from the execu- 

 tive branch on the "overall state of science and technology in the 

 Nation," a report which was required by the 1976 legislation even- 

 tually adopted. 



In preparation for the 1974 hearings, the committee also sent a 

 questionnaire to members of the National Academy of Sciences and 

 the National Academy of Engineering, asking their reactions and 

 recommendations. The replies started to pour in prior to the 1974 

 hearings. Although the results were not tabulated until later, 40 per- 

 cent of the National Academy of Sciences members responded to the 

 committee questionnaire, and 58 percent of the Engineering Academy 

 members — an unusually high percentage in any league, especially 

 considering the frequency with which those individuals were buffeted 

 with all types of questionnaires and tests. The responses dramatically 

 showed that no issue since the atom bomb and the war in Vietnam had 

 so shaken the scientific community. Emotionally upset, they tried hard 

 to restrain their feelings and furnish scientifically objective pre- 

 scriptions for what should be done. But there was no doubt that they 

 were demanding remedial action. 



Prior to the 1974 hearings, Teague and Mosher wrote to several 

 officials in OMB and NSF to confirm whether or not there had been 

 any significant changes in the organization and operations of the 

 science adviser apparatus over the prior year. Mosher was sufficiently 



