M II Ml l\ 1 111 \\ 111 I I Hi .1 SI 



627 



In a September 23, 1974, memorandum, Yeager himself outlined 

 the manner in which the committee would proceed with its tedious 

 labors: 



It is the intention of the Committee on Science and Astronautics to proceed 

 deliberately according to its original plan. We expe< I to have draft legislation dealing 

 with the foregoing matters completed within the next few weeks, but this will only 

 be for purposes of discussion and for refinement of the legislation. It is not the com- 

 mittee's intent to push action an any bill without careful and deliberate consideration, 

 iver, we would not wish to take any legislative action which dealt with the 

 function or organization of the Executive Office of the President which was not in 

 accord with the thinking and wishes ot the President. 



During the fall months of 1974 and into the early winter, Yeager 

 and Wells struggled with drafting the bill, reaching out for the 

 advice of many sources for assistance, suggestions, and review. Expert 

 draftsmen in the House legislative counsel's office helped, as did Dr. 

 Franklin P. Huddle and Mrs. Dorothy M. Bates of the Science Policy 

 Research Division of CRS. There were two significant developments in 

 the closing months of 1974 which materially affected the House 

 negotiations: First, the Senate put on a sudden burst of speed and on 

 October 11, 1974, passed an omnibus bill including the Academy of 

 Sciences recommendations plus the main features of Senator Kennedy's 

 old S. 32, the National Science Policy and Priorities Act, and a network 

 of State science and technology offices; second, shortly after Nelson 

 Rockefeller was confirmed as Vice President, he was assigned in 

 December 1974 by President Ford to make recommendations on what 

 form the Executive Office science machinery should take. 



BAD NEWS AND GOOD NEWS 



For the House committee, this was bad news and good news. It 

 was obvious that the Senate, by proceeding very quickly and with a 

 minimum of hearings, studies, advisory clearances, and careful drafting, 

 was setting the stage for serious conflict with the House — which is 

 exactly what eventually happened. The very good news was that a 

 longtime friend and supporter of science and technology, Vice President 

 Rockefeller, had been given clear authority to pull together policy 

 recommendations by the President. There was a sense of urgency in the 

 fact that President Ford asked for a report from Rockefeller within a 

 month. Now the House committee knew that they would not have to 

 fool around with rumors, stabs in the dark in preliminary studies by 

 the OMB, and fugitive papers which floated around purporting to 

 represent what the President wanted. The centerpiece had to be, in the 

 eyes of the House committee, a specific proposal which was not forced 

 down the throat of the White House but which could he embraced by 

 the President. 



