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HISTOR1 Ol Mil (OMMMTIl ON S( II \< I WD TECHNOLOGY 



Ottinger argued: 



This program simply helps fill the gap because of the tremendous inertia of the 

 automobile companies in developing alternative systems ot propulsion. * * * The 

 internal combustion engine in our society is the greatest waster we have and it seems 

 to me to fund this program is one ot the best investments we can make in the future. 



Goldwatcr kept very quiet during the debate on the President's 

 veto. Here was the same bill he had spoken out for when the conference 

 report was being passed several weeks earlier. His favorable remarks 

 were quoted on the rloor when the veto message was being considered. 

 But he wound up voting with the President to sustain the veto. Only 

 two other committee members, Bell and Conlan, joined him. 



THE HOUSE OVERRIDES, BUT THE SENATE SUSTAINS VETO 



The appeals and the organizational effort were once again effective. 

 The House on September 29 voted by 293 to 102 to override the veto — 

 29 votes more than the necessary two-thirds. But the efforts were sand- 

 bagged in the Senate, where Senate GOP Assistant Leader Robert P. 

 Griffin of Michigan rallied 35 votes. Senator Griffin came down hard 

 against expansion of Federal programs like the automotive R. & D. 

 legislation. The 1976 campaign had included a great deal of rhetoric 

 on overexpanded Federal programs which helped to buoy Griffin's 

 arguments. The Senate vote was 41-35, insufficient for the necessary 

 two-thirds to override. 



Picking up the pieces, Brown and McCormack wrote to their 

 House colleagues on December 14, 1976, inviting them to cosponsor 

 the same bill in 1977. The response was overwhelming. When the new 

 Congress assembled in January, Brown and McCormack decided that 

 they would short circuit the tedious legislative process. Instead of 

 going through the agonizing procedure of rehearing the entire bill, 

 they incorporated it into the DOE authorization act. 



This was accomplished in one deft stroke by Brown, when the 

 DOE authorization bill had reached the amending stage on the House 

 floor on September 21, 1977. The reason the bill came up so late in the 

 year was that the bitter fight over the Clinch River Breeder Reactor 

 had delayed the bill. As a matter of fact, Brown's action was akin to 

 sending a small patrol through the enemy lines while the cannonading 

 over the CRBR was going on in another sector. He simply rose and 

 offered the 5-year automotive propulsion R. & D. legislation as a 

 separate part of title III in the DOE bill, with these words: 



I rise to offer an amendment to Title III which had been worked out with the 

 administration and the various Members who have been actively involved with this 



