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long term resource productivity. The New England and Mid- 

 Atlantic Fishery Management Councils would thus continue in 

 the difficult situation they currently face, imposing 

 restraints on U.S. fishermen while having no control over 

 Canadian fishermen fishing the same stocks. 



The second category of consequences flowing from the 

 "no agreement" alternative includes the continuation and 

 possible increase of current risks to the environment. As 

 mentioned with respect to groundfish on Georges Bank, disa- 

 greement over appropriate national shares of the annual 

 harvests for shared stocks is likely to lead to exploita- 

 tion rates higher than either country individually would 

 recommend. Depending on the level of exploitation and the 

 length of time involved, stock abundance can be sharply 

 reduced. History demonstrates that depletion of stocks in 

 great demand has been the rule rather than the exception 

 from the North Sea to Georges Bank where two or more 

 countries have access to fishery resources in common with- 

 out an effective agreement on how such resources are to be 

 shared and managed . 



Many shared stocks, particularly scallops, cod, 

 haddock, and pollock, at present are subject to significant 

 risks of depletion. For example, the annual average 

 harvest of scallops from Georges Bank (Subdivision 5Ze) 



