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disputed northeastern section of Georges Bank would not 

 determine the share of fish either country should catch on its 

 side of the line. An intensification of effort might be anti- 

 cipated from the fishermen of either country in any portion of 

 the northeast peak of Georges Bank that remained available to 

 them, if it would assist them in avoiding socio-economic 

 dislocation. An illustration of the effect of an intensfi- 

 cation of effort occurred in the fall of 1978 when Canadian 

 vessels took a substantially higher share (39 percent) than 

 in recent years of the total Gulf of Maine and Georges 

 Bank haddock catch through concentrated fishing on just 

 the northeast part of Georges Bank. 



It is possible that a country having the predominant 

 proportion of a particular stock on its side of the boundary 

 might find that the other country, through more intensive 

 fishing in a limited area, was taking a disproportionate share 

 of the optimum yield from the stock in the interest of 

 avoiding disruption to its established fisheries. This could 

 make it even more difficult to negotiate a resource agreement 

 after a boundary settlement than before. The Agreement, 

 on the other hand, takes account of the eventual outcome of 

 the boundary settlement and provides for an adjustment of 

 entitlements partly based on the average annual proportion of 

 each stock occurring in the fishery zone of each Party. 



It is probable that a resource agreement negotiated 

 subsequent to boundary delimitation would result in a manage- 

 ment framework very similar to that in the proposed action. 

 Access and shares might vary according to the location of the 



