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In the case of Annex B stocks under the primary respon- 

 sibility of the United States, Canada is in a subordinate 

 position. The U.vS. proposals for annual management measures 

 will take effect unless the Commission agrees on modifications 

 to which the United States does not object. Canada may 

 object to the proposed or modified measures, but the measures 

 as approved by the United States will remain in effect despite 

 an objection unless and until the Co-Chairmen or the Arbitrator 

 overrule them and substitute alternative measures. Canada's 

 chances of prevailing in an objection are limited since 

 neither the Co-Chairmen nor the Arbitrator may overrule the 

 U. S. -approved measures without finding the measures to be 

 "clearly inconsistent" with the Agreement's governing prin- 

 ciples, which are patterned on the FCMA's national standards. 

 Because of the flexibility of the governing principles, 

 clearly inconsistent measures are likely to be encountered 

 infrequently. As in the Annex A situation, it can be expected 

 that Canada will be reluctant to exercise its objection 

 power with respect to proposed measures or modifications 

 that have been supported in the Commission by its own fishery 

 experts . 



Listed below, according to the Party having primary 

 management responsibility, are the Annex B stocks for which 

 the fishermen on each side are entitled to a specified 

 share of the PCC: 



