- 45 - 



situation. It has been suggested that the shared interest of 

 the U.S. and Canada in the stability of the valuable east 

 coast fishery would be sufficient for botli parties to prevent 

 competitive overfishing by their fishermen, and that through 

 informal governmental consultations, greater management flexi- 

 bility would prevail than under the proposed agreement. 

 However, Section I (A) of this statem.ent narrates tlie failure 

 of informal consultations during 1978 to produce interim 

 agreement on fisheries conservation and management goals or 

 to prevent competitive fishing for major stocks such as 

 haddock, cod, pollock and scallops, leading to catches m 

 excess of the expectations of either country. It also led 

 Canada to expell U.S. fishing vessels from the Canadian zone. 



Maintaining the status quo would continue to inhibit 

 management of stocks as a unit throughout their range. More- 

 over, it would leave unresolved the fundamental issue, namely, 

 how valuable marine resources which are liighly vulnerable to 

 overfishing, available to both countries, and in great demand 

 are to be shared and managed so as to preserve their long 

 term productivity. 



2 . Settlement of thg Maritime Boundary, Only 

 This alternative proposes that only the boundary be 

 resolved and that management of the marine environment includ- 

 ing fisheries management should be carried out by the U.S. 

 and Canada thereafter, each on its own side of tlie boundary. 

 Resolution of the boundary alone would clearly define the 

 maritime areas over which each party exercises fisheries 

 jurisdiction, and thereby eliminate the present area of over- 

 lapping jurisdictional claims. Any boundary other than 



