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Thus, there could be exacerbated risks of overfishing of 

 major fishery stocks that are currently fully exploited, 

 if there were any significant division of Georges Bank into 

 zones of exclusive fisheries jurisdiction for the United 

 States and Canada. In such a situation, the combined 

 efforts of the fishing vessels of the two countries in the 

 respective fisheries zones of the two countries could pro- 

 duce combined total catches that could compromise the long- 

 term productivity of the stocks. 



Pressures in the two countries to maintain established 

 fisheries, set against conflicting pressures to capitalize 

 on any apparent advantage flowing from a boundary settlement 

 dividing Georges Bank in some manner into exclusive fishing 

 zones for the two countries, might make it difficult either 

 to (1) conclude a fisheries agreement promptly after such 

 a boundary settlement, or (2) in the absence of som.e 

 agreement with Canada, to maintain the restraint necessary 

 to assure the long-term stability of shared and fully 

 exploited stocks. 



In summary, there are very substantial risks to the 

 protection and preservation of the fishery stocks associated 

 with this alternative, particularly if the U.S. boundary 

 position were not fully upheld and if there were no mechanism 

 in place to prevent competative overfishing. 



