B -15 



that it's a question on which our minds are still open. 



We would have to, in making and developing our policy 

 on our negotiating positions as we go along — try to make 

 some reasonable judgements as to what the negotiating situa- 

 tion is — make some political judgements as to what we can 

 can do. 



And, of course, one will have to be looking at two objec- 

 tives, let's say, between which there may be some tension. 

 One of these is to establish the conservation regime which 

 is as effective as possible in the conceptual sense. This 

 would argue, perhaps, for a moratorium until all of the neces- 

 sary machinery etcetera is in place and working. 



On the other hand, if one wants a conservation regime to 

 be effective, it has to include all those who engage in activi- 

 ties relating to the resources involved. There may well be 

 states which are interested in possible commercial harvesting 

 in the near future that would resist a moratorium very strongly. 



But this is the kind of process -- making those kinds of 

 judgements will be the kind of process that we are beginning 

 now in looking toward the negotiation, or the beginning of ne- 

 gotiations . 



MR. HARGROVE: I would gather then, from what you say, 

 that you haven't ruled out the possibility of putting on the 

 table, or discussing if somebody else puts on the table, an 

 interim moratorium of some sort -- notwithstanding the fact 

 that the Germans or the Soviets or others might find that a 

 distasteful component of a conservation and management regime. 



CHAIRMAN BREWSTER: No, we would not. 



MR. HARGROVE: Let me ask another question: The position 

 with which you went into the recently concluded meeting, partic- 

 ularly in respect of the fifth point which speaks of effective 

 enforcement arrangements — as well as your introduction a few 

 minutes ago, Mr. Scully, would seem to me to suggest that you 

 have in mind that a treaty is the end product of this negoti- 

 ating process. That certainly would be consistent with the 

 analogy of the sealing convention, for example. 



The recommendation, however, in its Section III envisages 

 that the Special Consultative Meeting will, among other things, 

 determine the form of the definitive regime, including the ques- 

 tion of whether it ought to be a convention. 



