-10* 



plan to fish in Antarctic waters. The presumed potential 

 resources, at least that of krill, are large. Economic 

 factors and operating conditions may serve to limit the 

 extent of commercial harvesting. 



However, such a laissez-faire approach to harvesting 

 of Antarctic marine living resources would pose the max- 

 imum risks to the Antarctic marine ecosystem and to the 

 long term potential of that ecosystem as a source of sus- 

 tained protein yields. The approach would provide neither 

 for controls on harvesting nor for the means of developing 

 data on the potential resources themselves. The direct 

 dependence on krill for food by most other potential re- 

 source populations makes the dangers of overexploitation 

 particularly acute. 



A variant of the no action approach would be the post- 

 ponement of efforts to deal with exploitation of Antarctic 

 marine living resources, a no-action-now approach. This 

 option rests on either or both of two premises. One is 

 that the magnitude of the resource is so great that har- 

 vesting need not be regulated for some time to come. The 

 other is that the incentives for an effective system of 

 conservation will be greatest at some point in the future, 

 specifically when large scale harvesting, and its implica- 

 tions, become a reality. 



There is, however, extensive evidence, based on expe- 

 rience in efforts to conserve marine resources in other 

 areas of the world, that "after-the-fact" regulation is 

 not effective. Sustained unregulated harvesting could have 

 unforeseen, perhaps irreversible impacts on the Antarctic 

 marine ecosystem. Initiation of effective regulation would 

 likely be more difficult once substantial economic stakes 

 in uncontrolled methods of harvesting are created. 



B. National Action 



This alternative rests on the assumption that regula- 

 tion by individual countries of vessels and nationals under 

 their jurisdiction engaged in exploitation of Antarctic 

 marine living resources can provide the basis for adequate 

 conservation of the resources. 



National action could be coordinated through negotia- 

 tion of commitments among the nations involved to regulate 

 harvesting, ranging from a simple undertaking to control 

 harvesting to an obligation to follow specific guidelines 

 in regulating the nationals and vessels under their juris- 

 diction. This alternative could also incorporate informal 

 commitments to share scientific and catch data and to 



