ON PRESENTING MY THEORY 41 



I do not believe in science for its own sake, I believe 

 only in science for man's sake." 



The thinker does not and can not accept the cold 

 facts of science about life, without inquiring into the 

 meaning of these facts : What is their relation to the 

 warm, throbbing questions about man's destiny and 

 his "place in nature"? What is the place of "life" 

 in the larger scheme of things of which we have 

 cognizance? Certainly the problem of life directly 

 touches the core of all philosophical inquiry : it indeed 

 is the kernel of the problems of philosophy. 



As Harald Hoeffding, professor of philosophy at 

 the University of Copenhagen, admits, "it is difficult 

 to draw a sharp line between philosophy and natural 

 science." However, a broad general distinction be- 

 tween science and philosophy is found in that, 

 characteristically, science concerns itself simply with 

 the "how?" and philosophy chiefly with the "why?" 

 of things. 



It is easy, then, to see that there is a vast difference 

 between a theory and a philosophic thought-scheme. 

 The fact that a theory has profound philosophic 

 import, does not confer upon the one who presents 

 it the privilege of injecting philosophical con- 

 siderations into it; nor does the fact that a theory 

 has profound philosophic import, impose the duty 

 of exhibiting such import. And, plainly, the theory 



