V. GRANT 45 



arrived at in three different ways. We have seen that the typo- 

 logical species definition leads to the conclusion that the species 

 is a subjective entity. The nominalistic species concept frankly 

 eschews the search for an objective criterion of species. It remains 

 to note that the biological species concept itself denies the exist- 

 ence of definite species units in certain plant groups. In fact, a 

 large part of the species problem, as it currently exists in botany, 

 arises from the attempt to apply the species concept to groups 

 in which biological species do not exist. The view of many bota- 

 nists that the species is undefinable is, in such groups, justified by 

 the facts. 



If one wishes to use the term species everywhere throughout 

 the plant and animal kingdoms, one must adopt the typological 

 species concept, since morphological similarity and convenience 

 in classification are the only criteria that can be applied univer- 

 sally. The general usage of the species category is a traditional 

 practice in taxonomy. It has even become a dogma, sanctioned 

 by a pronouncement in the Code of Nomenclature that all plants 

 belong to species. Neither the species concept of primitive man, 

 nor that of the naturalist, nor that of Linnaeus, however, was 

 based on a consideration of organisms representing all the types 

 of life cycle now known to modern biology. The historical grounds 

 for applying the species concept to all forms of life are conse- 

 quently not compelling. 



The issue between alternative concepts of the species can and 

 should be decided on the basis of the respective merits of the 

 contending viewpoints rather than on purely historical considera- 

 tions. The chief advantage of the typological species concept is 

 its universality; this meritorious feature is offset by the corre- 

 sponding disadvantage of subjectivity. The biological concept, 

 on the other hand, enables us to define the species objectively in 

 the numerous and dominant class of sexual organisms, but it is 

 not applicable outside such organisms. 



To the present author, the privilege of applying a subjective 

 species definition to all organisms does not represent a very im- 

 portant gain; whereas the price that must be paid for this priv- 

 ilege, namely the giving up of an objectively defined species con- 



