172 THE CASE AGAINST EVOLUTION 



ciple a dynamic factor rather than an entitive principle, 

 refers to the vital principle as a "non-material," "non-spatial" 

 agent, though the term energy would be more precise. To 

 this active or dynamic vital principle Driesch gives a name, 

 which he borrowed from Aristotle, that is, entelechy. In 

 so doing, however, he perverted, as he himself confesses, the 

 true Aristotelian sense of the term in question: "The term," 

 he says, ". . . is not here used in the proper Aristotelian 

 sense." ("History and Theory of Vitalism," p. 203.) His 

 admission is quite correct. At the critical point, Driesch, for 

 all his praise of Aristotle, deserts the Stagirite and goes over 

 to the camp of Plato, Descartes, and the Neo-vitalists ! 



Driesch's definition is as follows: "Entelechy is an agent 

 sui generis, non-material and non-spatial, but acting 'into' 

 space." {Op. cit., p. 204.) Aristotle's use of the term in this 

 connection is quite different. He uses it, for example, in a 

 static, rather than a dynamic, sense: "The term 'entelechy,' " 

 he says, "is used in two senses; in one it answers to knowl- 

 edge, in the other to the exercise of knowledge. Clearly in 

 this case it is analogous to knowledge." ("Peri Psyches," 

 Bk. II, c. 1.) Knowledge, however, is only a second or static 

 entelechy. Hence, in order to narrow the sense still further 

 Aristotle refers to the send as a first entelechy, by which 

 he designates a purely entitive principle, that is, a constitu- 

 ent of being or substance (cf. op. cit. ibidem). The first, or 

 entitive, entelechy, therefore, is to be distinguished from all 

 secondary entelechies, whether of the dynamic order corre- 

 sponding to kinetic energy or force, or of the static order corre- 

 sponding to potential energy. Neither is it an agent, because 

 it is only a partial constituent of the total agent, that is, 

 of the total active being or substance. Hence, generally 

 speaking, that which acts (the agent) is not entelechy, but the 

 total composite of entelechy and matter, first entelechy being 

 consubstantial with matter and not a separate existent or being. 

 In fine, according to Aristotelian philosophy, entelechy (that 

 is, "first" or "prime" entelechy) is not an agent nor an energy 



