THE ORIGIN OF THE HUMAN SOUL 207 



when they admit material molecules as the extended substrate 

 of extramental or physical phenomena, while denying the ex- 

 istence of the mind or ego as the inextended substrate of 

 intramental or psychic phenomena. All substance, whether 

 material or spiritual, is inaccessible to the senses. Even ma- 

 terial substrates are manifested only by their phenomena, 

 being in themselves supersensible and "metaphysical." If, 

 then, the human understanding is inerrant in ascribing a 

 material substrate to extramental phenomena, then it is 

 equally inerrant in attributing to intramental phenomena the 

 intimate substrate called mind, whether this substrate be a 

 spiritual substance, or a material substance like the sub- 

 strate of physical phenomena and that of organic life. As a 

 matter of fact, the Psychophysical Parallelists actually do 

 reduce mental phenomena to a material substrate (viz. the 

 cerebral cortex). Their phenomenalism, which we will refute 

 presently, is but a disingenuous attempt to gloss over their 

 fundamental materialism. At all events, they are willing to 

 admit an ultimate substantial ground of thought and volition, 

 provided it is not claimed that this substrate is of a spiritual 

 nature. The bare existence of some substrate, however, is 

 all that we assert, for the present. 



Before leaving this topic, we wish to call attention to the 

 fact that the subject of thought and desire is active as well as 

 passive. Mind, in other words, is not merely a persistent me- 

 dium wherein passive mental states are maintained, but an 

 active and synthetic principle as well. Mental processes, like 

 those of judgment, reasoning, and recognition, require a unitary 

 and unifying principle, which actively examines and compares 

 our impressions and thoughts, in order to discern their rela- 

 tions to one another and to itself. Materialistic psychology, 

 in spite of the plain testimony of consciousness, is all for ig- 

 noring the mind in its active role as the percipient of the iden- 

 tities and discrepancies of thought, and for regarding mind 

 as a mere complex of mental states or transient flux of fleeting 

 imagery. It is well, then, to bear in mind the indubitable 



