214 THE CASE AGAINST EVOLUTION 



then, like memory and imagination, merely continue and 

 combine what was preexistent in the exterior senses. Their 

 composite imagery is rigidly proportioned to the extended 

 neurograms imprinted on the cerebral neurons, and these 

 neurograms, in turn, are determined both qualitatively and 

 quantitatively by the physical impressions received by the 

 receptors, and these impressions, finally, are exactly propor- 

 tioned to the action of the material stimuli in contact with the 

 receptors. Thus the composite images of imagination as well 

 as those of direct perception are proportioned to the underlying 

 neurograms of the cortex and correspond exactly, as regards 

 quality, intensity, and extensity, to the original stimulus af- 

 fecting the external receptors. Hence men born blind can 

 never imagine color, nor can men born deaf ever imagine sound. 

 An inextended principle, such as the discarnate soul, cannot 

 receive or record impressions from extended vibrant media, or 

 from extended corporeal masses. For this the soul requires the 

 intrinsic cooperation of material receptors. Now, the highest 

 cognitive and appetitive functions of the brute {e.g. sense-per- 

 ception and emotion) are, as has been stated, of the sensitivo- 

 nervous or psycho-organic type, that is, they are functions in 

 which the material organism intimately cooperates; brute ani- 

 mals give no indication of having so much as a single function, 

 which proceeds from the soul alone and which is not communi- 

 cated to the organism. Hence the bestial soul is "totally im- 

 mersed" in matter; as regards both operation and existence, it 

 is "intrinsically dependent" upon its material complement, the 

 organism. It never operates save in conjunction with the lat- 

 ter, and its sole reason for existence is adequately summed up 

 in saying that it exists, not for its own sake, but merely to 

 vivify and sensitize the organism. Consequently, the brute 

 soul, though inextended and incorporeal, belongs, not to the 

 spiritual, but to the material, order of things. 



Is the human soul equally material in nature, or does it 

 belong to the spiritual category of being? The state of the 

 question has long since been formulated for us by Aristotle: 



