THE ORIGIN OF THE HUMAN SOUL 217 



fully developed. Obviously, then, rational functions cannot 

 be spiritual, inasmuch as they are not independent of the 

 organism. 



This time-honored objection of materialists is based on a 

 misapprehension. It falsely assumes that spirituality ex- 

 cludes every kind of dependence upon a material organism, 

 and that our assertion of the soul's independence of matter 

 is an unqualified assertion. This, however, is far from being 

 the case. It is only intrinsic (subjective), and not extrinsic 

 (objective), independence of the organism which is here af- 

 firmed. An analogy from the sense of sight will serve to make 

 clear the meaning of this distinction. In the act of seeing a 

 tree, for example, our sight is dependent upon a twofold cor- 

 poreal element, namely, the eye and the tree. It is dependent 

 upon the eye as upon a corporeal element intrinsic to the visual 

 sense, the eye being a constituent part of the agent and sub- 

 ject of vision; for it is not the soul alone which sees, but 

 rather the soul-informed retina and neurons of the psycho- 

 organic composite. The eye enters as an essential ingredient 

 into the intimate constitution of the visual sense. It is a 

 constituent part of the specific cause of vision, and it can 

 therefore be said with perfect propriety that the eye sees. 

 Such dependence upon a material element is called intrinsic 

 or subjective dependence, and is utterly incompatible with 

 spirituality on the part of that which is thus dependent. 

 But the dependence of sight upon an external corporeal factor, 

 like a tree or any other visible object, is of quite a different 

 nature. Here the corporeal element is outside of the seeing 

 subject and does not enter as an ingredient into the compo- 

 sition of the principal and specific agent of vision. True the 

 tree, which is seen, is coinstrumental as a provoking stimulus 

 and an objective exemplar, but its concurrence is of an ex- 

 trinsic nature, not to be confounded with the intrinsic co- 

 agency of the eye in the act of vision. Hence, in no sense 

 whatever can the tree be said to see; for the tree is merely 

 m object, not the principal and specific cause, of vision. 



