218 THE CASE AGAINST EVOLUTION 



When the dependence of an agent upon a corporeal element 

 is of this sort, it is termed extrinsic or objective dependence. 

 Such dependence upon a material element is perfectly com- 

 patible with spdrituality, which does, indeed, exclude all ma- 

 teriality from the specific agent and subject of a psychic act, 

 but does not necessarily exclude materiality from the object 

 contemplated in such an act. Hence the fact that the thinking 

 soul must abstract its rational concepts from the concrete 

 imagery of a cerebral sense, like the imagination, in no wise 

 detracts from its spirituality, because the dependence of ab- 

 stract thought upon such imagery is objective or extrinsic, 

 and not subjective or intrinsic. 



Psychologists of the sensationalist school have striven to 

 obscure the fundamental distinction which exists between ra- 

 tional thought and the concomitant cerebral imagery. It 

 is, however, far too manifest to escape attention, as the healthy 

 reaction of the modern school of Wlirzburg indicates. "It 

 cost me great resolution," says Dr. F. E. Schultze, a member 

 of this school, "to say, that, on the basis of immediate ex- 

 periment, appearances and sensible apprehensions are not 

 the only things that can be experienced. But finally I had 

 to resign myself to my fate." ("Beitrag zur Psychologie des 

 Zeitbewusstseins," p. 277.) 



But thought is not only distinct from imagery, often there 

 is marked contrast between the two, both as regards sub- 

 jective, and objective, characters. Thus our thought may be 

 perfectly clear, precise, and pertinent, while the accompany- 

 ing imagery is obscure, fragmentary, and irrelevant. "What 

 enters into consciousness so fragmentarily, so sporadically, so 

 very accidentally as our mental images," exclaims Karl 

 Biihler (also of Wlirzburg), "can not be looked upon as the 

 well-knitted, continuous content of our thinking." {Archiv. 

 fur die ges. Psychol, 9, 1907, p. 317.) The same contrast 

 exists with respect to their objective characters. Imagination 

 represents by means of one and the same image what reason 

 represents by means of two distinct concepts, e.g. an oasis 



