220 THE CASE AGAINST EVOLUTION 



of imagery which she has in common with such persons is 

 negligible. ''Eine Bedeutung," says Biihler, "kann man 

 uberhaupt nicht vorstellen, sondem nur wissen" and Binet, 

 in the last sentence of his "L'Etude experimentale de I'intel- 

 ligence," formulates the following conclusion: "Finally — and 

 this is the main fact, fruitful in consequences for the phi- 

 losophers — ^the entire logic of thought escapes our imagery." 

 Nevertheless, thought does not originate in the total ab- 

 sence of imagery, but requires a minimal substrate of sensible 

 images, upon which it is objectively, if not subjectively, de- 

 pendent. The nature of this objective dependence is explained 

 by the Scholastic theory concerning the origin of concepts. 

 According to this theory, the genesis of our general and ab- 

 stract knowledge is as follows: (1) We begin with sense- 

 perception, say of boats differing in shape, size, color, material, 

 location, etc. (2) Imagination and sense-memory retain the 

 composite and concrete imagery synthesized or integrated from 

 the impressions of the separate external senses and 

 representing the boats in all their factual particularity, 

 individuality, and materiality, as existent here and 

 now, or there and then, as constructed of such and 

 such material (e.g., of wood, or steel, or iron, or con- 

 crete), as having determinate sizes, shapes, and tonnages, 

 as painted white, or gray, or green, as propelled by oar, or 

 sail, or turbine, etc. (3) Then the active intellect exerts 

 its abstractive influence upon this concrete imagery, accen- 

 tuating the essential features which are common to all, and 

 suppressing the individuating features which are peculiar to 

 this or that boat, so that the essence of a boat may appear 

 to the cognitive intellect without its concomitant individua- 

 tion — ^the essence of a boat being, in this way, isolated from 

 the peculiarities thereof and its various qualities from their 

 subject (representatively, of course, and not physically). 

 (4) The imagery thus predisposed, being no longer immersed 

 in matter, but dematerialized by the dispositive action of the 

 active intellect, becomes comstrumental with the latter in 



