232 THE CASE AGAINST EVOLUTION 



inclining us toward that which the intellect apprehends as 

 good. The objects of such volition are frequently abstract and 

 immaterial ideals transcendent to the sphere of concrete and 

 material goods, e.g., virtue, glory, religion, etc. The will of 

 man, moreover, is free, in the sense that it can choose among 

 various motives, and is not compelled to follow the line of 

 least resistance, as is the electric current when passing through 

 a shunt of steel and copper wire. Like the self-knowing intel- 

 lect, the self-determining will is capable of reflective action, 

 that is, it can will to will. Having its own actions within its 

 own control, it is itself the principal cause of its own decisions, 

 and thus becomes responsible for its conduct, wherever its 

 choice has been conscious and deliberate. External actions, 

 which escape the control of the will, and even internal actions 

 of the will itself, which are indeliberate, are not free and do 

 not entail responsibility. Our courts of law and our whole 

 legal system rests on the recognition of man's full responsi- 

 bility for his deliberate voluntary acts. The distinction 

 between premeditated murder, which is punished, and unpre- 

 meditated homicide, which is not, is purely moral, and not 

 physical, depending for its validity upon the fact of 

 human freedom. It is this exemption from physical deter- 

 minism, that makes man a moral agent, subject to duties, 

 amenable to moral suasion, and capable of merit or demerit. 

 Finally, the will of man is insatiable, invincible, and inex- 

 haustible. The aspirations of the will are boundless, whereas 

 our animal appetites are easily cloyed by gratification. There 

 is no freezing point for human courage. The animal or sensual 

 appetites wear out and decline with old age, but virtue and 

 will-power do not necessarily diminish with the gradual de- 

 terioration of the material organism. Willing, therefore, is a 

 superorganic or spiritual function. Activity which is bound 

 to a material organ cannot tend towards supersensible ideals, 

 cannot escape physical determinism, cannot achieve the reflec- 

 tive feat of spurring itself to action, cannot avoid exhaustion, 

 cannot elude rigid regulation by the laws of organic metab- 



